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Beginning with Mr. Justice Harlan's suggestion that the principle of non-retroactivity in constitu-
tional criminal procedure cases should be re-examined, the author traces the development of that rela-
tively new concept and concludes that it should now be abandoned.
In 1962, while serving a nine-year sentence in
the Louisiana State Penitentiary for a 1958 bur-
glary, Victor Linkletter filed in a federal district
court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, al-
leging confinement pursuant to a conviction based
upon evidence seized in violation of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. His fate was ultimately
determined in 1965 by the Supreme Court of the
United States, which implicitly agreed that evi-
dence had been admitted against Linkletter in
violation of the exclusionary rule of Mapp v.
Ohio. The Court denied relief solely because Link-
letter's conviction had been affirmed upon appeal
to the Louisiana Supreme Court and the time for
petitioning for certiorari had elapsed before June
19, 1961, the date of the Mapp decision.2 For the
first time the Supreme Court had held that it and
the courts whose judgments it reviews possess the
power to deny the benefit of a constitutional right
to a person equipped with a procedural remedy for
challenging the lawfulness of present incarceration
attributable to a denial of that constitutional
right.'
1367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Linkletter court assumed
that the court below correctly determined that the
seizure had been unlawful.
2 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
'The remedy here was federal habeas corpus. For a
pre-Linkletter view that the federal habeas corpus
statute, now 26 U.S.C. §2241 (1964), by its wording pro-
hibits anything but full retroactive application of new
decisions, see generally Torcia & King, The Mirage of
Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66
DicK. L. Rxv. 269 (1962).
Although not unexpected in some circles, the
decision was novel and totally without precedent
The retroactivity problem is generally not thought of
in terms of remedies, although one manner of decreas-
ing the impact of a new constitutional decision would
be to limit the use of collateral remedies. See Traynor,
Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuxE
L.J. 319, 341-42; see also In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879,
880, 366 P.2d 305, 306, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 890 (1961)(concurring opinion). Very recently Justice Black, pur-
suing the same theme, declared that the federal habeas
corpus statute should be interpreted to exclude attacks
upon convictions unless the alleged constitutional error
is related to the reliability of the determination of in-
nocence or guilt. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217, 231-42 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Justice Harlan
finds this proposal unacceptable because of the "deter-
rence" value of habeas corpus. See Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (dissenting opin-
ion). The possibility of review via habeas corpus is said
to motivate reviewing courts to faithfully apply even
those Supreme Court decisions such as Mapp which
are not designed to improve the reliability of the fact-
finding process. Because of the great volume of cases,
certiorari by itself is not sufficient for this deterrent
urpose. Justice Harlan further noted, supra, that this
deterrent purpose could be served simply by giving a
petitioner the benefit of the law as it existed at thetime of direct review and not at the time the petition is
being heard. His tentative proposal is that only this
older law be applied in habeas corpus proceedings, but
the proposal is limited to cases where the constitu-
tional right allegedly violated has not the purpose of
increasing the reliability of the fact-finding process. As
Harlan himself noted, this test would require the federal
district judge to make a determination of what the law
was on a particular past date, which may have come
between the date of a slowly eroded decision and the
date of the decision which finally overruled the old
decision by name. It would also require him to assess
the purpose of the new decision, not always an easy
task.
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in the United States Reports. 4 Yet the "prospec-
tive-only" device5 quickly became an accepted
part of the constitutional criminal procedure scene
in America. In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott'
the Court in 1966 gave to the constitutional re-
quirement announced in Griffin v. California7
(forbidding non-neutral judicial and prosecutorial
comment upon a defendant's decision not to testify)
the same treatment it had given to the Mapp
exclusionary rule. In Johnson v. New Jerseys the
Court denied the constitutional rights recognized
in Escobedo v. Illinois9 and in Miranda v. Arizona"
even as much retrospective effect as it had given
Mapp and Griffin v. California. As long as the trial
in which the constitutionally inadmissible state-
ment had been used commenced on or prior to the
date of the decision in question, the violation
could not be urged even on direct appeal.n Thus
some prisoners were denied relief from the viola-
tion of their constitutional rights even though
their convictions, to use the Linkletter word, had
4 Some commentators, a few federal circuit courts,
and many state courts had anticipated and urged such
a result. For a full catalogue, see generally Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 n.2; Schwartz, Retroactivity, Re-
'liability, and De Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin,
33 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 719 n.2 (1966); Comment, Link-
letter, Sholt, and the Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64
MfIcH. L. R-v. 832 n.6, 833 n.14 (1966).
The word retroactive is disfavored because it sug-
gests the phrase ex post facto, which, in turn, is pejora-
tive. The latter phrase is normally inapplicable tojudicial decisions. Frank V. Magnum, 237 U:S. 309,
344 (1915). Retroactive application is a normal char-
acteristic of judicial decisions, not an unwholesome ex-
tension of judicial power. It is "one of the central
principles in our received learning on the common
law." Comment, Prospective Overriling and Retroactive
'Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE LJ. '907(1962).
6 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
7 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
8 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
9 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1 In Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S.-, 89 S. Ct. 1677
(1969), the Court held that Escobedo and Miranda do
not apply to re-trials of cases tried before the dates of
those decisions but retried afterwards following a re-
versal. Nothing prevents the States from giving full
retrospective effect to any constitutional decision which
the Supreme Court has not treated so generously. See,
e.g. In Re Estate of Melody, - Ill. 2d_-, 248 N.E. 2d
104 (1969), applying the "non-retroactive" decision in
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), retroactively to
benefit Bloom's less culpable co-defendant. Such State
decisions, however, are rare. It will be interesting to
observe whether those States which prior to Jenkins
had applied Escobedo and Miranda to re-trials will
now abandon that practice.
not yet become "final" before the date of the new
decision in question.12
In 1967 the right to counsel at line-ups and
show-ups recognized in United States v. Wade" and
Gilbert v. California14 immediately was made almost
wholly prospective in Stovall v. Denno.i5 Prose-
cutors were permitted to use eyewitness identifica-
tions obtained in violation of the constitution al
right to counsel, except in the prosecutions of Wade
and Gilbert themselves, even in future trials, as
long as the violation had occurred on or before the
date of the Wade and Gilbert decisions' 6 Thus in
each of the cases where the Supreme Court in its
opinions considered the issue through the end of
the 1966 Term, the Court decided against full
retroactivity, even though prior to the 1965 Link-
letter decision it-had never decided against retroac-
tivity for a constitutional criminal procedure
decision. Elsewhere the Court lapsed into its old
familiar practice of applying retrospectively deci-
sions recognizing for the first time certain constitu-
tional rights, without any discussion of the issue 7
In its '1967 Term the Court contiiued'down its
new path by holding that decisions which require
that the option of a jury trial be aA'ilable to
defendants in state criminal trials for other than
petty offenses would be applicable only to trials
commencing on or after the date of those deci-
sionis.'1 But in two other 1968 decisions 'the Su-
preme Court expressly rejected prospective-only
application for two other newly recognized rights. 9
i2 "By final we mean where the judgment of con-
viction was rendered,. the availability of appeal ex-
hausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had
elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio."- 381 U.S.
at 622 n.5.
13 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
14 388 U.S. 263 (1967).11 388 U.S. 293 (1967).16 A fully prospective decision would not benefit the
defendant in whose case the Court chose to announce,
by dictum, a new rule. Although the violation of Gil-
bert's right to counsel at a line-up was remedied as to
his state conviction, he was not so lucky as to his fed-
eral conviction, which involved the very 'same line-up.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the federal
case. Gilbert v. United States, 388 U.S. 922 (1967).
,
7 E.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), gave
relief on right-of-confrontation grounds from a state-
court judgment which had become final before the
Court had extended the confrontation guarantee of the
Federal Constitution to state-court defendants in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
8DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), denied
full retroactivity to Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194(1968), and to Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968).
19 Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), declared
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In the 1968 Term the Court expressly held
retroactive three decisions recognizing the right
to counsel at certain critical stages of trial-court
proceedings and implementing the right of con-
frontation.n However Katz v. United States was
held not to prohibit the introductions of conversa-
tions seized in violation of Katz as long as the evi-
dence was seized on or before the date of that
decision.Y Lee v. FloridaP was held to prohibit the
use of unlawfully intercepted communications in
state trials held after the date of Lee but was held
not to affect cases tried on or before that date.2-
It thus appears that the prospective-only tech-
nique, as new as it is, is a permanent Tixture, the
only dispute being when and to what degree it
should be invoked. It is natural, then, for com-
mentators to focus upon the issue of which newly
recognized constitutional rights will be or should
be applied retrospectively and which merit prospec-
tive-only treatment. This is a hazardous business,
however, since whatever is written may, soon be-
come out-dated with the announcement- of a new
Supreme Court opinion, holding this decision
prospective or that decision retrospective and
destroying whatever order the commentator had
perceived in the past decisions. 25 What has been
the full retroactivity of Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968), which had condemned the admission
at a joint trial of a defendant's confession implicating a
co-defendant. Footnote 22 of Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968), let it be known that Witherspoon
would be applied retroactively to all cases where
veniremen had been challenged for cause who indicated,
without more, conscientious scruples against the death
penalty.
20 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), White-v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), and Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719 (1968), were declared retroactive in Mc-
Connell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968), Arsenault v.
Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968), and Berger v. Cali-
fornia, 393 U.S. 314 (1969), respectively.'
21389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
392 U.S. 378 (1968).
21 Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968). The Appendix
provides a list of the critical dates under the Court's
prospective-only rulings.25 This fate befell Schwartz, supra- note 4, although
it surely detracted little from his fine essay. Even as
the present article is prepared for publication, retroac-
tivity issues are pending before the Court. The Court
has requested briefing on the retroactivity of its "double
jeopardy" decisions of the 1968 Term. See Price v.
Georgia, 395 U.S-, 89 S. Ct. 2138 (1969); Jacques v.
New Jersey, 395 U.S-, 89 S.Ct. 2138 (1969); Moon
v. Maryland, 395 U.S-, 89 S. Ct. 2135 (1969). Retro-
active application of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.,
89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969), will be at issue in future search
and seizure cases. See Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395
U.S._, -, 89 S.Ct. 2051, 2052 (1969); Shipley v. Call-
lacking is a critical re-examination of the Link-
letter decision and of the prospective-only doctrine
itself. The legitimacy of the principle almounced
in Linkletter-that the Supreme Court has the
power to dictate a timetable for the application
of constitutional rights--should be re-evaluated.
Only very recently Mr. Justice Harlan, who had
previously concurred in the prospective-only
decisions, reversed his position and called for a
re-examination:
I have in the past joined in some of those
opinions which have, in so short a time, gen-
erated so many incompatible rules and incon-
sistent principles. I did so because I thought
it important to limit the impact of constitu-
tional decisions which seemed to me pro-
foundly unsound in principle. I can no longer,
however, remain content with *the aoctrinal
confusion that has characterized our efforts to
apply the basic Linkletter principle. "Retroac-
tivity" must be rethought.20
Hopefully this essay is something more than a
highly critical evaluation of a short seres of deci-
sions which have given birth to an indestructible
principle.27 Justice Harlan's call for re-examination
reminds us that Justice Douglas has' dissented
from every decision denying full retroactive effect
to a previous decision recognizing a constitutional
right. justice Black has never recognized the
prospective-only device as a legitimate- judicial
tool in this area. of the law.2 Justice Marshall once
rejected its use in a situation where, if ever proper,
it should have been used. 29 Former Justice Fortas
fornia, 395 U.S-, __, 89 S. Ct. 2053, 2055 (dissenting
opinion of justice White). .26 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969)
(dissenting opinion).
27This is so well established that a civil litigant,
claiming that a Supreme Court decision, if made to
operate retrospectively, would work an economic detri-
ment to it because of its justifiable reliance upon the
old law, recently cited the prospective-only cases from
the criminal constitutional area to support its position.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968). just a few short years ago
prospective-only decisions were frequent in civil eco-
nomic disputes but unheard of in criminal constitu-
tional litigation. See text accompanying notes 81-93,
infra.
21 Justice Douglas has expressly dissented in each
such case. justice Black has either joined him in dissent
or, more recently, has concurred with the denial of re-
lief for the reason that he believes the new constitu-
tional decision relied upon is erroneous. See e.g., Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969) (concurring
opinion).29 It is generally agreed that if any decision should be
denied retroactive application it is Mapp. But Mr.
Justice Marshall disagreed. See United States ex rd.
19691-
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expressed concern over the rewarding of jurisdic-
tions which act only under Supreme Court compul-
sion, which appears to be an inherent characteristic
of its use. 0 The prospective-only technique, the
present author claims, facilitates Supreme Court
intrusions into state criminal justice administra-
tion abhorred by Justice Harlan and often disap-
proved by justice White and by justice Stewart.u
On the other hand, it is recognized that if the
prospective-only device is abandoned, it will only
incidentally mark the triumph of sound reason.
For the most part, such an event would reflect the
decision of more conservative justices that they
can play a more dominant role in criminal proce-
dure decisions by refusing to permit the Court
freedom to create constitutional requirements ap-
plicable to the future only which, if applied retro-
spectively, would cause disruption of criminal
administration intolerable to conservatives and
liberals alike.
Because the author believes that the prospec-
tive-only device originated as a concession to the
dictates of a rigid system of dual federalism but
that that device, ironically, has grown to be one
of the greatest enemies of federalism, extensive
attention is paid to the historical context in which
the prospective-only technique was conceived and
which context it eventually altered.
TEm DECLINE 0F FEDERALISm AND
A PROPOSED CONCESSION
The suggestion that United States Supreme
Court decisions recognizing "new" constitutional
rights need not or should not be applied retroac-
actively was first made in connection with Grifin v.
Illinois,2 Mapp, and Gideon v. Wainmwright.8 In
1956 Mr. justice Frankfurter made the first such
suggestion in his concurring opinion in Grffin8
and in 1958 justice Harlan and Justice Whittaker
renewed the proposal that Grifin be denied retro-
spective effect. 5 In 1963 justice Harlan proposed
that the Court at least consider whether Gideon
Angelet v. Fay 333 F.2d 12, 21 (2d Cir. (1964) (dis-
senting opinion), aff'd, 381 U. S. 654 (1965).
30 See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 276-
77 (1969) (dissenting opinion); see also note 202 and
accompanying text, infra.
1 These decisions particularly include Miranda and
Wade. See text accompanying notes 207-08, infra.
2351 U.S. 12 (1956).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34351 U.S. 12, 25-26 (1956) (concurring opinion).
88 Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison
Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (dissent-
ing opinion).
should be applied retroactively. 6 And, of course,
in Linkletter the Supreme Court in 1965 heeded
the call for a non-retroactive application of Mapp.'
Not coincidentally, Griffin v. Illinois, Mapp, and
Gideon can be viewed as the first Supreme Court
decisions which had sudden and significant impact
upon state criminal justice administration, putting
to one side the segregated-jury decisions, which
involved an overriding factor not present in other
criminal procedure cases.
Before a 1952 decision of narrow applicability,"3
the Court had aided state-court defendants in
only two main areas: the right to trial counsel and
the exclusion of involuntary confessions. From
1952 to 1960 the areas where relief was granted
were extended very little.89
Even in the trial-counsel and the confession
areas, the expansion of procedural safeguards for
state-court defendants was painfully slow. Al-
though the first case in which the Supreme Court
granted genuine relief to a state-court defendant
on due process grounds in 1932 held that counsel
must be afforded a defendant in a capital case if
he is being tried in a lynching atmosphere, 0 a
quarter of a century later the Supreme Court still
had not acknowledged an absolute right to counsel
in every state trial where a defendant faced a
possible sentence of death. Similarly, the Court
advanced slowly in damning the various methods
of extracting admissions from a suspect.
The earliest decisions had little impact because
they did not involve disputes over proper stand-
ards. Alabama law no more permitted the trial of
Powell without counsel than did Mississippi law
allow the use of confessions extorted by beatings
and torture where a timely objection was made at
trial." The disputes were limited to issues such as
whether real assistance of counsel had been afforded
and whether a timely objection had been made.
Even when the Supreme Court in the 1940's
"Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963)
(dissenting opinion).
37 See generally the articles and cases cited in the
notes referred to in note 4, supra.
,8 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S .165 (1952).
39 For instance, in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959), a state prisoner won a reversal because of the
state's knowing use of false testimony. In Thompson v.
City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), the Supreme
Court created the principle that it is a violation of the
Federal Constitution to sustain a conviction where the
record is wholly devoid of incriminating evidence-a
principle generally limited to the civil rights context in
which it arose.
40 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
1 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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began to differ with the States as to the standards
of voluntariness to be used in determining the
admissibility of confessions, and as to the nature
of the "special circumstances" which required
that trial counsel be provided,4 the Supreme Court
decisions had little impact because they were de-
cided on narrow grounds. A reversal here and a
reversal there does not have the same sudden and
significant impact upon a state as does the setting
of precise requirements for the States to meet if
they wish to sustain convictions--such as were
specified in Gideon, Miranda, and Wade. For
instance, up to 1963 five states had not been ter-
rified enough by the prospect of reversals, under
the ever-expanding "special circumstances" test,
to grant counsel as a matter of right to indigent
defendants in all felony trials. 43 That the other
states had recognized such a right could be at-
tributed as much to a sense of justice at the state
level as to the fear of reversal by the federal
courts. 1 Even if the Supreme Court decisions
contributed to the gradual uplifting of state stand-
ards, the impact of any one decision was never
great.
The slowness in the Supreme Court's fashioning
of constitutional rules binding upon the States
cannot be explained by the failure of counsel to
urge that the Court use the Due Process clause for
this purpose. Such arguments were advanced at
least as long ago as 1887 and with frequency after
Powell's conviction was reversed in 1932. 45 Nor
can it be attributed to a brooding conservatism in
matters of individual rights. Federal-court defend-
ants had been accorded for decades the very rights
which the Supreme Court had denied, as a matter
of constitutional requirements, to state-court de-
fendants. It was the Supreme Court of the United
States which in 1914 fashioned a federal exclu-
sionary rule for the fruits of unlawful searches and
the Supreme Court which refused to apply such a
2The special circumstances doctrine was derived
from Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4The five states were Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and South Carolina. Silverstein, The
Continuing Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright, 51 A.B.A.J.
1023, 1024 (1965).
" Twenty-two states joined in an amicus brief in
Gideon urging reversal.
41 See Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). See gen-
erally Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal
.uistice, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 191, 194, 200 (1958). For an
explanation of this phenomenon which, contrary to
Dean Allen's, does emphasize that relatively few state
cases actually reached the Supreme Court, see Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HA~v. L.
ZEv. 1, 4 (1956).
rule to the States until 1961.46 Other rights recog-
nized under the fifth and sixth amendments for
federal-court defendants were similarly denied to
state-court defendants.
7
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to in-
tervene in state criminal law administration and
the gap between the constitutional or judge-made
rights for federal defendants and those under the
Federal Constitution for state-court defendants
must be explained by the Supreme Court's respect
for the principles of a strict dual federalism and
for the belief that sound reasons justified Supreme
Court restraint in interfering with the freedom of
individual states to develop their own systems of
criminal justice. Part of the slowness was probably
also due to the envisioned impact of the announce-
ment of new standards retroactively applied, for
this was one potential source of federal-state fric-
tion. As Dean Allen has pointed out, the Court
itself acknowledged as much in 1947 in explaining
its refusal to adopt a "Gideon-type" rule!8
Two remarkable decisions reflect the extent to
which state independence in matters of criminal
procedure was respected by the Supreme Court in
this era. In Wolf v. Colorado49 the Supreme Court
in 1949 permitted the States to use as evidence in
criminal cases the fruits of searches which admit-
tedly violated the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. In 1952 the Court permitted transgressions
of Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act5" to occur openly in a state court where inter-
cepted messages were divulged and used as evi-
dence.A
The 1956 case of Griffin v. Illinois was strikingly
different from all its predecessors. It placed a
broad obligation upon the States in an area (ap-
41 Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), with Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4
7 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319(1937); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). In Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1932), four dissenters apparently
believed that the sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion was binding upon the States, while the majority
did not reach that issue. Yet it was not until Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), that the Supreme Court so
held.48 Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State
Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAUL L.. 213, 230(1959). Justice Frankfurter had spoken of the pos-
sibility of "opening wide the prison doors of the land."
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947).4"338 U.S. 25 (1949).
60 47 U.S.C. §605 (1964).
51 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), was
finally overruled by name in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S.
378 (1968).
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pellate review) where the Supreme Court had not
previously ventured. In effect, it required Illinois
to supply tianscripts for at least one appeal by
every indigent convicted of a state felony 2 Besides
applying to a large number of states, Griffin's
equal-protection rationale suggested that other
aspects of appellate review would not remain free
from federal control. Retroactively applied, it
would create an immediate and severe burden upon
the States' appellate systems.5 In short, it was a
sudden and significant intrusion by the Supreme
Court of the United States into state criminal-law
administration.
The 'concurring opinion in Griffin written by
Justice' Frankfurter, whose 'vote was decisive,
sharply reflects the tensions between individual
rights add'state independence. Frankfurter believed
that the dictates of federalism should not be
ignored eren'in the face of what he termed "squalid
discrimination"' against indigents. He suggested
that the States would still be free to implement
the decision in their own fashion, affording indi-
gents effective appellate review in whatever man-
ner they 'desired, without having to supply the
indigent with opportunities for review identical
to those available to more affluent appellants. He
also urged, without success, that the States should
be spared the impact of a retroactive application
of Grffin-a suggestion which had no prior ana-
logne in cdinstitutional criminal procedure decisions
of the Supreme Court.
52 A suggestion was made by the majority that dif-
ferent methods of review might be provided for in-
digents, equal to that obtainable by non-indigents.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956). In a series of
cases down to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), the Supreme Court has not yet approved any
appellate scheme which has not afforded the indigent
precisely what a paying client could purchase.
"Before the March 1, 1957, deadline under Illinois
Supreme 'Court Rule'65-1, ITLL. Rnv. Stat. ch. 110,§101.65-1 (1957), adopted to open the appellate door
for those for whom it had been shut because of indigency
prior to Griffin, 548 petitions for transcripts were
granted by Cook County courts alone. Allen, Gri fin v.
Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
151, 160 (1957). This in turn required the establish-
ment of an appellate division of the Cook County
Public Defender's office to replace the inadequate sys-
tem of private voluntary appellate programs. With
each logical extension of Griffin, the number of indigent
appeals grows. See generally Doherty, Wolf! Wolf! The
Ramifications of Frivolous Appeals, 59 J. CRM. L., C. &
P.S. 1 (1968). The chief victims are defendants not on
appeal bond serving short sentences and, especially,
civil litigants. See generally English, Crisis in Civil Ap-
peals, 50 CHICAGO B. 1Ec. 231 (1969). Griffin's rationale
was extended to misdemeanors in Williams v. Oklahoma
City, 395 U.S.-, 89 S.Ct. 1818 (1969).
Judged by the twin standards of suddenness
and significance, the next Supreme Court opinion
with real impact upon the States was Mapp v.
Ohio. In 1961 Mapp forced a large number of
states to change their ways decisively and im-
mediately. At the time of Mapp about half of the
States still did not employ an exclusionary rule
for evidence which had been unlawfully seized."
Applied to past convictions this decision would
place a heavy burden upon state systems of crimi-
nal-law administration. Hearings would have to be
held in large numbers. Guilty men would go free
either because the States did not have'the resources
to carry the defense against claims of unlawful
seizures to a successful conclusion or because es-
sential evidence had-been unlawfully seized and
offered at trial.
Again the Court in Mapp felt compelled to pay
tribute to proper state-federal relations. The Court
was unusually patient in explaining why it believed:
Wolf must be overruled. The symmetry created,
by the identity of the exclusionary rules now to be,
used in both state and federal courts was hailed as
a triumph for federalism." Nevertheless, almost
immediately a cry went up urging that the States
be spared the impact of a retroactive application
of Mapp.
56
The Wolf-Mapp dispute, more than any other,,
may itself be viewed as a debate over the extent
to which the Supreme Court should dictate federal
requirements to remedy wrongs prevalent in the
state systems and the extent to which the States
should be left to improve their own systems in
their own time and according to their own fashions.
Mapp may be viewed as the final warning to the
States that federal standards would be imposed
whenever the States failed to provide adequate pro-
cedural safeguards in their systems of criminal-law
administration. The restraint prior to Mapp-for
instance, in not applying the Griffin equal-protec-
tion rationale, as all logic dictated, to require free
trial and appellate counsel for indigents in state
courts-was remarkable.
After two more years of relative inactivity-
from the viewpoint of sudden, significant impact-
the warnings ended. In 1963, using a due-process
rationale, the Court in Gideon established the indi-
gent's right to counsel in all felony cases. Applied
retroactively, as Gideon was, the decision required
14 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 633 n.17 (1965).
11367 U.S. at 657-58.51 See e.g., Traynor, supra note 3.
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re-trials and releases from prison unparalleled in
American history. As to the future, it meant that
five states had to take immediate action to provide
counsel where they had not previously provided it.
No excuses about inadequate resources or about
the absence of enabling legislation would be ac-
cepted. The concession to federalism urged upon
the Court by Gideon's counsel was mere lip service:
state courts would now be reversed less often than
they had been under the old expanding "special
circumstances" test.
A respect for the dictates of federalism was no
longer a meaningful restraint upon the Supreme
Court in matters of criminal procedure. Individual
liberty had too long and too often been slighted
by the States and by past Supreme Court decisions
which had refused to right the wrongs. On the day
of the Gideon decision, Griffin v. Illinois was applied
to establish the indigent's right to appellate counsel
in the first of a series of cases which has had sig-
nificant impact upon state appellate practice. 7
Immediately after this day, the Court ventured
into areas where it had never before imposed
standards upon the States: wiretapping,"3 self-
incrimination,59 pre-trial publicity,6" and the
procedure for determining the voluntariness of a
confession." A conviction was upset because the
Supreme Court disliked the idea of a sheriff who
had custody of a jury testifying as a state witness.6 2
States were told what language used by a lawyer
in open court could amount to contempt and what
language could not be punished." On the day of
the Linklelter decision the States were also in-
formed that they would be required to adhere to
federal standards with respect to the news media's
coverage of a trial itself." Moreover, these new
rights for state-court defendants had a broader
impact because new habeas-corpus decisions had
widened the avenues for federal review of state
convictions.6"
The regularity with which the Supreme Court
now intervenes in state criminal law administra-
57 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1953), was
followed that same day by Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487 (1963), and by Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963).
IClinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964).
19 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
60 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
61 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
6Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).63Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965).64 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 131 (1965).
65Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1964); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
tion should not make the modem observer un-
mindful of the simple historical fact that these
recent decisions have been handed down by a
court which had not reversed any state-court
conviction prior to 1932, which for two decades
thereafter had limited its intervention to narrow
holdings in two areas of state criminal procedure,
and which prior to 1963 had rendered only two
decisions which had sudden and important im-
pact upon the States.6
From this background, the 1965 Linkletter
decision emerges as an attempted concession to the
interests of federalism, now so readily neglected
elsewhere. The States strongly urged that Mapp
not be applied retroactively and correctly observed
that the consequences of a retroactive application
would be serious.7 At the same time, this theory
demands an explanation of why the prospective-
only doctrine was not applied to Grffin in 1956 or
to Gideon in 1963 or even to Mapp much sooner
than it was.
In Griffin the State of Illinois quite naturally
fought against the free-transcript rule and did not
concern itself with the retroactivity issue. It is
surmised that Justice Frankfurter's suggestion
that Griffin be denied retroactivity was little more
than an afterthought which the full Court may
never have consideredY1 Or it was quickly dis-
missed because of its novelty. After the denial of a
petition for rehearing in which Illinois urged that
Frankfurter's suggestion be adopted, the Supreme
Court of Illinois swiftly and laudably demonstrated
a willingness to give the benefit of the decision to
all prisoners-however stale their. convictions-
who had been discriminated against in: the manner
forbidden by Griff n and who were presently
incarcerated pursuant to convictions which had
not been appealed for want of a transcript.69 Since
Frankfurter's suggestion appeared in his opinion,
and since it had not been adopted, the impression
66An opinion illustrative of the wilingn ess to inter-
vene in state cases is that of three justices in Skinner v.
Louisiana, 393 U.S. 473 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
The federal question upon which the three would have
reversed was whether the trial judge erred in not grant-
ing a continuance to an ill attorney who carried on
without a noticeable decline in his performance.
67 The National District Attorneys' Association filed
an important brief in the case.
68 The silence of the dissenter Harlan is more signifi-
cant than the majority's failure to refer to the Frank-
furter suggestion since Harlan later agreed that the
suggestion was meritorious. See text accompanying
note 71, infra.
11 See note 53, supra.
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was that it had been rejected?0 Either because of
this or because of the demonstrated willingness
and apparent ability of Illinois to handle a fully
retroactive Gri.ffin, when prospective-only applica-
tion was suggested by Justices Harlan and Whit-
taker in 1958 in connection with an appeal relying
on Griffin n7 it was rejected without so much as a
comment by the majority of the Court. It may also
be true that the Court felt that since the "squalid"
discrimination against indigents went to the issue
of the reliability of their convictions, this was not
an appropriate case in which to adopt a new doc-
trine to deny retroactive application to one of its
important decisions.
In connection with Gideon little consideration
of the prospective-only possibility is in evidence--
even though by 1963 the learned journals were dis-
cussing that possibility in connection with Mapp,
and even though Justice Harlan, without neces-
sarily endorsing prospective-only treatment for
Gideon, at least urged discussionY2 Gideon had
been a unanimous decision, and unanimous deci-
sions need not be compromised by a limitation of
their impactV3 In addition, Gideon, for all its sig-
nificance, was not an unpopular decision? 4 A prom-
ise had been made in Gideon to those, like Gideon,
whose convictions were final but whose guilt was
in doubt because of the denial of the assistance of
trial counsel. Almost no one urged that that prom-
ise should be broken.
Mapp v. Ohio, by contrast, was the ideal case
for the emergence of the prospective-only doctrine.
Perhaps the existence of a general power of the
Supreme Court to limit constitutional decisions
applicable to criminal procedure to prospective-
only operation would have been denied on theo-
retical grounds from the very beginning if the
discussion had not occurred in a climate where the
Wolf-Mapp dispute was a critical factor. At stake
was the continued incarceration of prisoners the
reliability of whose convictions was not in doubt.
At the very least, great administrative problems
70 But see United States v. Sanders, 142 F. Supp.
638 (D.D.C. 1956), surely one of the first prospective-
only opinions in the area of constitutional criminal
procedure.
7 Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison
Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 216 (dissenting
opinion).
72 Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963)
(dissenting opinion).
73 The prospective-only opinions, with the exception of
the latest ones, have limited the application of rights
recognized by a badly divided court.
74 See note 44, supra.
would result from the large number of hearings
which would have to be held to determine whether
the rights of those guilty men had been violated.
Finally, the States could rightly complain that
the Supreme Court had suddenly overturned a
clear decision which was little more than a decade
old Y5
The Supreme Court did not determine the Mapp-
retroactivity issue for four years. It is not beyond
belief that the silence was by agreementy 6 This
silence has been criticized,7 but it had the effect
of making the Linkletter opinion more respectable
because Linkletter was foreshadowed by the opin-
ions of some commentators and some federal and
state judges in the years which immediately fol-
lowed Mapp.7
THE LnmL TTER "PREcEDENTS"
Mr. Justice Clark, the author of the majority
opinion in Linkletter, engaged in a quest for prece-
dent for the novel proposition that his court could
apply the Constitution according to a judicially-
created timetable. Everyone was aware that com-
mon-law rules and judicial interpretations of
statutes are sometimes changed for the future
onlyY9 Justice Clark may have felt compelled to
write such a lengthy opinion because he realized
that such cases were weak precedents for what the
Court did in Linkletter. Yet, in the end, he was
satisfied with the assertion that while his authority
dealt with "the effect of a decision overturning
long-established common-law rules there seems
to be no impediment-constitutional or philo-
sophical-to the use of the same rule in the con-
stitutional area where the exigencies of the situa-
tion require such an application." 80
If we acknowledge that we are applying a tech-
nique employed in one area of the law to an area
76 The significance of reliance upon Wolf v. Colorado
is discussed in notes 172-73 and the accompanying text,
infra.
70 justice Clark said that Mapp had not foreclosed
the issue. 381 U.S. at 620 n.2. justice Black in dissent
did not disagree, although between 1961 and 1965
many commentators tried to divine the Court's intent
from a close reading of Mapp. See Bender, The Retro-
active Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PENN. L. Rv. 650, 668-70
(1962).
7 See, e.g., Nothrop, The Suprene Court and Crimnina
Procedure, 26 MD. L. REv. 1, 8, 12 (1966).78 See generally the articles and cases referred to in
the notes mentioned in note 4, supra.
79 See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Me-
morial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1965).
80 381 U.S. at 628.
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where it has not been used before, our reflections
should not be upon its applications in the first
area--as were Justice Clark's-but rather upon
the similarities and differences between the two
areas which will either permit or prohibit the use
of the technique in the second area. No such analy-
sis is offered by the Linkletter majority. Its opinion
is well worth studying as a classic in the misuse of
precedent.
Retroactive Application of Past
Constitutional Decisions
The Linkletter majority opinion acknowledged
that the Supreme Court's previous practice had
always afforded the benefit of newly recognized
higher constitutional standards of criminal pro-
cedure to all citizens, whether the claim of a
violation was raised at trial, on appeal, or during a
collateral attack upon a conviction. justice Clark
wrote: "It is true that heretofore, without discus-
sion, we have applied new constitutional rules to
cases finalized before the promulgation of the
rule." 81 This fact loses none of its significance
simply because it is candidly admitted. Prior to
Linkletter the Court's practice always had been to
apply new constitutional decisions retroactively
and never did a majority opinion even consider
that something less would be permissible.
A study of the United States reports, focusing
particularly on per curiam opinions, would reveal
hundreds of instances of relief granted by virtue
of the retrospective operation of at least a dozen
newly recognized constitutional rights. In addition
to the retroactive application of Griffin in Eskridge,
per curiam reversals of final convictions in right-
to-counsel cases after 1963 depended upon the
retroactive application not only of Gideon but also
of Carnley v. Cochran,82 which had placed a greater
burden upon the States on the issue of knowing
waiver.83 Douglas v. California4 and Jackson v.
Denno were both applied retrospectively in sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions88 The newly
announced rule of Massiah v. United States," after
being applied to the States,8s was quickly applied
81 Id.
369 U.S. 506 (1962).
s3 See e.g., Huggins v. Raines, 374 U.S. 105 (1964),
vacating 372 P.2d 248 (Okla. Crim 1962).
84 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
85 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
"G See e.g., Luckman v. Dunbar, 372 U.S. 708 (1963),
a plying Douglas; Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43(1964), applying Jackson.
87377 U.S. 201 (1964).
99 McLeod v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964).
in a case which had become final before Massiah
had been decided8 The 1957 decision in Moore v.
Michigan98 vacated a 1938 guilty plea by invoking
constitutional standards which had not evolved
until long after 1938. In 1961 the Supreme Court
vacated a 1936 conviction because of the admission
into evidence of a confession which was involuntary
only when measured against constitutional stand-
ards undreamed of in 1936.91
Many of these decisions represented conscious
rejections of suggestions that a prospective-only
doctrine be recognized in the area of constitutional
criminal procedure. The fact that such suggestions
were not deemed worthy of comment by any
majority opinion weighs heavily against a sugges-
tion that the Court believed that prospective-only
treatment could be accorded some constitutionally
required procedural safeguards but not the one in-
volved in the particular case before the Court. For
instance, before the Court applied Grffin v. Illinois
retrospectively, it had the benefit of Frankfurter's
suggestion, the Illinois petition for rehearing, the
respondent's argument in Eskridge, and the plea
of the two dissenting justices in Eskridge. The
prospective-only doctrine was also suggested and
silently rejected by a majority of the Court in cases
which depended upon the retrospective applica-
tion of the rights newly announced in Gideon,
Jackson v. Denno, and Douglas v. California.'2 In
short, the unarticulated premise of Supreme Court
89 Lyles v. Beto, 379 U.S. 648 (1965). McLeod and
Lyles have been ignored by several courts which have
declared Massiah non-retroactive, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Coyle, 427 Pa. 72, 233 A.2d 542 (1967), vacated on
otler grounds sub nom. Lopinson v. Pennsylvania, 392
U.S. 647 (1968).
90 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
92 Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961). Former Pro-
fessor James R. Thompson has suggested to the present
author that Moore and Reck may be viewed as decisions
announcing new standards, rather than as decisions
which apply retroactively previously announced new
standards. The validity of this perceptive observation
depends upon how one views the Court's treatment of
precedent in Moore and Reck. It is interesting to note
that the district judge in Reck declared that under
contemporary standards the confession was involuntary
but then denied relief by judging the case according
to 1936 standards. United States ex rel. Reck v. Ragen,
172 F. Supp. 734, 745-47 (1959). justice Marshall
found significance in the Court's failure to even con-
sider the propriety of this ruling in reversing Reck's
conviction. See United States ex rel. Angelet v. Fay,
333 F.2d 12, 24 (2d. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion),
aff'd, 381 U.S. 654 (1965).
See Justice Harlan's dissents in Pickelsimer v.
Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963), as regards Gideon; in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 439-44, as regards




conduct was, as Judge Hastie stated in applying
Gideon to reverse a pre-Powell v. Alabama, con-
viction: "Our system is not so unenlightened as
to require that in attaching present consequences to
1931 occurrences, a judge must ignore all of the
insight that men learned in the law and observant
of human behaviour have acquired concerning the
essentials of tolerable criminal procedure during
the past thirty years." 91
Prospective-Only Precedents From Other
Areas of the Law
The Linkletter majority opinion was largely
devoted to a recital of precedents from other areas
of the law where a court sometimes denies its own
new decisions retrospective application8 4 Bingham
v. Miller"5 was chosen as representative of the
"legislative divorce" cases. The Ohio court in
Bingham ruled that the Ohio legislature, under the
state constitution, had no power to sever lawful
marriages, although it had been exercising that
power on occasions for over forty years. The Ohio
court refused to deem invalid the legislative divorce
decree in the case before it. It reasoned that such a
decision would bastardize children born of a mar-
riage contracted by one of the parties after the
legislative decree. Since apparently no previous
Ohio judicial decision had upheld the legislature's
power to grant divorces,9" the case lacked the
element of reliance upon case law which is typical
of the prospective-only judicial decisionsY. Rather,
the Ohio decision was based upon a frank expres-
sion of sympathy for certain individuals despite
the fact that the state constitution, as interpreted
in Bingham, weighed against their claims. Because
of this, such a case is not adequate precedent for a
holding which continues the incarceration of
individuals who have a valid constitutional claim
which has been recognized in Mapp or some other
new decision.
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque" exemplified cases
94Craig v. Myers, 329 F.2d 856 (3rd Cir. 1964).
4 Teprecedents used followed very closely those
discussed in the comment written by a Yale student(now a law professor) cited in note 5, supra. Unlike the
LinkLetter majority, the commentator was not em-
ploying these precedents to support a legal argument.
95 17 Ohio 445 (1848).96The Bingham opinion mentioned no such de-
cision.97 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968).
98 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). This was an un-
fortunate example of municipal-bond cases since it was
complicated by a federalism issue. The Supreme Court
was not choosing to give prospective-only treatment to
where a court holds that a municipality had no-
authority under state law to issue bonds but then,,
nevertheless, permits bondholders to enforce bonds.
issued prior to the date of the decision which over-
turned prior decisions holding that such issues were-
lawful. In these cases property rights of individuals
are balanced against the principle that munici-
palities are governments of limited power and the-
rule that no theory of estoppel can be invoked to-
circumvent that principle. The triumph of property
rights of individuals who, according to the latest
decision, have no valid legal claim, does not justify
the denial of the right to life or liberty of indi-
viduals with a constitutional claim which, ac-
cording to the latest decision, is valid.
The Linkletter majority also cited, as typical of
the use of the prospective-only technique, cases in
which a surprising judicial decision suddenly
makes a crime out of conduct which occurred
prior to the decision and which was lawful accord-
ing to the decisions prevailing at the time the con-
duct was performed. The New Mexico court in
State v. Jones"s construed a statute to make certain.
conduct unlawful but refused to apply its decision
to conduct which occurred prior to that date. The
United States Supreme Court in James v. United
States1s effectively did the same thing. But the
refusal to incarcerate a person who acted unlaw-
fully but in reliance upon a judicial decision that
his conduct was lawful is not adequate precedent
to justify the continued incarceration of a person
one of its own decisions. Rather it was deciding not to
apply retrospectively an Iowa decision which had in-
terpreted the Iowa law so as to overrule previous Iowa
decisions on the municipal-bond question. The Supreme
Court denied retroactive application even though the
Iowa courts apparently had not done so. See 68 U.S. at
208 (dissenting opinion).
99 42 N.M. 623, 107 P.2d 324 (1940).
100 366 U.S. 213 (1961). The conviction could not have
been reversed unless some members of the court ac-
cepted the argument that the proscribed conduct could
not have been engaged in "wilfully" unless the actor
knew that his conduct was forbidden. The refusal in
James to use the more straightforward technique of
State v. Jones has little significance. In Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S-
52 (1964), the court used the prospective-only tech-
nique to prevent punishment of a person whom it hadjust ruled had no right to refuse to testify in a state pro-
ceeding in which he had been granted immunity. The
Court reasoned that the defendant reasonably be-
lieved, because of the Court's past decisions, that the
immunity grant would not protect him from a federal
charge. Of course his refusal to testify came long before
any United States Supreme Court decision declared
that the Federal Constitution prohibited the compul-
sion of testimony in state proceedings whatever might
be the state or federal consequences. Hence the finding
of "reliance" in Murphy was rather generous.
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whose conviction involved a violation of his con-
stitutional rights. Justifiable reliance by' state
officials that their conduct was lawful, as Justice
Black noted in dissent,10' does not create the same
type of vested interest as an individual has in a
decision which means freedom or loss of liberty
or life. The fact that cases like James and Jones
and cases like Linkletter all are criminal cases is of
no analytical significance'
0 2
The Court also cited a dissenting opinion of
Justice Black and used it to support a proposition
which Black himself, in his Linkletter dissent, quite
properly suggested it did not support. Black had
proposed that a new rule of trustee liability fash-
ioned by the Supreme Court should not be ap-
plied retroactively to a trustee who had had no
reason to believe that his conduct would create
personal liability.'0 Th6 proposal was fairly typical
of cases which refuse to penalize a party econom-
ically for his reasonable reliance upon a past judi-
cial decision. As such, it provided no concept of
vestedness arising from judicial reliance analogous
to the claim by a state that it should be permitted
to keep the fruit of its unconstitutional conduct,
namely the deprivation of a citizen's liberty or the
right to take a citizen's life. The majority's de-
cision in the trustee case, on the other hand, per-
mitted a retroactive application of a new rule
which caused one party economic detriment while
giving a second party an admittedly deserved ec-
onomic benefit. If this case has any value as prec-
edent, it is that the majority opinion could be used
to support a retroactive application of Mapp,
giving citizens relief from the violation of their
constitutional rights even in the face of a govern-
ment claim that there was something unfair about
this.
In connection with these cases, Justice Cardozo's
writings were also cited to support the proposition
that courts sometimes give prospective-only treat-
ment to their own decisions. The address from
1
'Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 652 (1965)
(dissenting opinion).
14 justice Clark concluded from James and Jones
that there was "no distinction... between civil and
criminal litigation" with respect to the prospective-
only technique. 381 U.S. at 627. But the dvil-criminal
distinction was much less important than the difference
between preserving freedom from incarceration and
denying freedom and between denying an individual a
constitutional right and aiding an individual even
though the law or the constitution as recently inter-
preted weighs against his claim.
103 Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 275 (1951) (dis-
senting opinion).
which Justice Clark quoted reveals the -kind of
cases for which Cardozo was urging the applica-
tion of this technique.' °4 His prime example was
the problem faced by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in deciding whether the law of fixtures should
be altered in so far as it applied (or did not
apply) to gas ranges. This was a problem which
clearly involved justifiable reliance by sellers of gas
ranges upon past judicial decisions which did not
require them to record their security interest in
the ranges. It was a problem which had nothing to
do with either human freedom or federal constitu-
tional rights. If any of Cardozo's writings suggest
that the application of the prospective-only tech-
nique could properly be used when the latter ele-
ments are present, neither the Linkletter majority
nor the present author has been able to find
them s Cardozo's view of the process whereby a
safeguard in criminal procedure is elevated to a
constitutional requirement binding upon the States
as an almost sacred event100 indicated that he could
not have agreed with Justice Clark's refusal even
to consider the differences between the common-law
cases and the federal constitutional cases for the
purpose of determining whether the prospective-
only technique used in the first area might be in-
appropriate for use in the second area.jO
104 55 REP. N.Y. STATE BAR AssN. 263 (1932), re-
printed in M. L. HALL, SELEcrED WrrrmGs oF BENJA-
=NATHAN CAuRozo 7, 34-37 (1947).
105 None of the works cited by Cardozo in his address
and none of the works cited in those works speak of the
prospective-only technique in connection with the Bill
of Rights. Rather that technique is discussed amidst
much more humble settings. See, e.g., J. WVIGMORE,
PROBLEMS oe LAW (1920); Kocourek, Retrospective De-
cisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal, !7 A.B.A.J.
180 (1931); Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against
The Retrospective Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18
18 COUM. L. REv. 230 (1918). For a discussion of
Cardozo's thoughts on the use of the prospective-only
technique, see generally Schaefer, The Control of "Sun-
bursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 631 (1967).
100 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937). See also justice Harlan's comment upon Car-
dozo's would-be reaction to the present manner of
elevating procedural safeguards to constitutional
rights, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 183 (1968)
(dissenting opinion).
10 7 Likewise the old dispute over the Blackstonian
theory of the "discovery" of law by judges obviously
had nothing to do with new interpretations of the
United States Constitution. Generally proponents of
the prospective only technique seek to force opponents
into a Blackstonian stance so that in refuting the claim
that judges discover law, the proponents will havejustified the use of the technique tey propose. Com-
pare the discussion of Blackstone in the respondent's
brief in Linkletter with justice Black's specific refusal
1969]
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One difference between alteration of common-
law rules and fresh interpretations of the Consti-
tution has already been discussed: the notion of
vested interests in the common-law cases has no
analogue in the constitutional cases. Other differ-
ences arise from the fact that judicial overruling
of a judge-made law or of a long-standing judicial
interpretation of a statute is closely analogous to a
legislative determination. When the New York
Court of Appeals restructures the law of fixtures
to take account of changing conditions or when the
Illinois Supreme Court abolishes the tort immunity
of school districts, the judges perform a task clearly
within the legislature's competence. Often such a
court is criticized precisely for this reason,'8 al-
though it seems clear that an active judicial role in
an area where the legislature could act is not al-
ways to be condemned. 0 9
The legislative nature of these new decisions is,
of course, heightened when they are accorded
prospective-only treatment. Statutes, not judicial
decisions, normally operate for the future only.
The more a judicial decision is denied effect upon
past transactions, the more it comes to resemble a
statute. A completely non-retroactive decision is
remarkably similar to a legislative enactment.
Two consequences follow from this similarity.
In the first place, the prospective-only judicial de-
cision altering a judge-made rule or a long-stand-
ing interpretation of a statute is not irrevocable.
The Court may reverse itself again if it wishes. An
independent body with the resources for a thorough
study of the subject, namely the legislature, can,
and is often urged to study the whole problem and
impose a better solution if it finds one. This means
that the sense of freedom with which a court can
to invoke the name of Blackstone to resolve the Link-
letter dispute. 381 U.S. at 643.
"'8 See, e.g., Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.
738, 743 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964) (dissenting opinion); see
also James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 222 (1961)
(concurring opinion). Black said in James that the
Court acts too much like Congress when it overturns a
long-standing interpretation of a statute. For this rea-
son, many states have a strong presumption againstjudicial overruling of a long-standing judicial interpre-
tation of a statute. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 41 11.2d
511, 517, 244 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1969).
109 In fact, it has been argued that courts should act
in this fashion as a sort of catalyst for a larger legisla-
tive reconsideration of an entire area of the law. See
Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing Govern-
mental Immunity, 1964 DuKE L. J. 888, 892. Thus, for
example, the decision which re-classifies a gas range as a
fixture may be viewed as calling for new legislative re-
*structuring of a major segment of the law of secured
transactions.
approach such a problem is quite significant, its
decisions affecting only the future and still subject
to revision.
Secondly, when a judicial decision is overturned
in prospective-only fashion, the party who is denied
the benefit of the new rule because his transaction
occurred prior to the decision has no more right to
complain than does a person who suffers because
the legislature was slow in passing a statute which
would have benefitted him if it had been enacted
more swiftly. So long as the old law did not amount
to a violation of his right to substantive due proc-
ess, he has no standing to complain. This was the
precise holding and reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court in a case which permitted state
courts to use the prospective-only technique and
which rejected the argument of a party who
claimed that the state could not thus deny it the
benefit of its new decision 10
On the other hand, when the Supreme Court of
the United States elevates a procedural safeguard,
to the level of a constitutional right it is not meant
to be performing a legislative function. Its deci-
sion will probably be irrevocable."' Its solution to
a problem is certainly not subject to legislative
review, to be accepted or rejected depending upon
the results of a thorough study. Subsequent legis-
lative solutions are generally made impossible."2
The Supreme Court, therefore, should not feel
the same sense of freedom which a legislature feels,
or which a reviewing court feels in announcing the
prospective-only overruling of an old common-law
precedent. The prospective-only technique, by
nullifying the impact of a decision on past trans-
actions and by partially quieting the Court's
critics, makes the Court's sense of freedom to
forge new law much greater than if the technique
did not exist.n" As is subsequently suggested,"4
"
0 Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil Re-
fining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
m The abolition of the "mere evidence" limitation
upon seizures in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967), is one of the very few instances where some
protection has been taken away by the Supreme Court,
which properly perceives that there is something un-
seemly about judicial decisions which take away rights
previously recognized in decisions interpreting the
first eight or the fourteenth amendments.
"' This is one of the main complaints of some of the
Court's critics, who, unlike Congress, have read de-
cisions such as Miranda as not being subject to legisla-
tive overruling or revision. See, e.g., Inbau, Editorial,
57 J. CRn. L., C. & P.S. 377, 378 (1966).
"'See Mishkin, Forward: The High Court, The Great
Writ, and The Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HA.v.
L. RyEv. 56, 70 (1965).
"
4 See text accompanying notes 207-08, infra.
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decisions such as Miranda and Wade would have
been totally impossible absent the availability of
the prospective-only technique.
When we are speaking of decisions which will
be binding upon the States, there is yet another
reason for not permitting the technique to increase
the Supreme Court's sense of freedom. If dual
federalism has any meaning left, it suggests that
state legislatures should, have a certain freedom to
order their own systems of criminal justice and
that not every "good idea" which occurs to a
majority of the United States Supreme Court
should immediately be imposed upon the States.
Secondly, when the Supreme Court holds that
a safeguard is constitutionally required but then
accords its decision prospective-only treatment,
the citizen who remains incarcerated has much
more of a standing to complain than if an old com-
mon-law rule or statute was altered too late to
benefit him. In the latter case he can complain only
if the old rule violated his constitutional rights.
But in the former case that is precisely the situa-
tion-and he has a very recent Supreme Court
decision to prove it, namely the overruling de-
cision.
Thirdly, when the Court functions like a legisla-
tive body through the use of the prospective-only
technique, it degrades the process of constitu-
tional interpretation. In rejecting a theory of the
general availability of the technique in the area of
constitutional criminal procedure, Professor Mish-
kin focused his attention upon the damage to the
Supreme Court's symbolic role in constitutional
interpretation?' 5 An analysis in terms of the cheap-
ening of constitutional rights themselves might
also be offered.
A new law is not degraded because it operates
only prospectively, nor is a judicial rejection of a
long-standing common-law rule. In both cases,
the promulgating body says that the new rule is
better and wiser, not that the old rule violated
someone's constitutional rights. No appeal to an
authority higher than the sound judgment of the
promulgating body is necessary.
But the Supreme Court must damn with vehe-
mence an old rule when it raises a new safeguard to
the level of a constitutional right. It is insufficient
for the Court to say that the old rule was unwise
U Mishkin, supra note 113, at 56, 62-63. But c.f.
Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the Supreme Court in
the Age of the Positive State: A Preliminary Excursus,
1967 DuKE L.J. 273, 522.
or inferior to the new rule. The Constitution itself
must be interpreted as compelling the new rule. If
this be a fiction, it is a fiction essential to any ra-
tional system of constitutional adjudication, as
Mishkin has noted."6 Having damned the old rule,
how can the Court continue to give it effect in
cases where a proper remedy exists to correct the
wrong? If the rights recognized in Wade and Gil-
bert are so important, how can the Court deny
relief to prisoners, some under sentences of death,
whose constitutional rights were violated in the
same manner as Wade's and Gilbert's?1 If the
Supreme Court does not take its decisions any
more seriously than that, how can it expect the
people and the States to take them seriously?
The heart of this criticism is reflected in the
commonly held view advanced by the Court's
critics: there are rights, such as the right recog-
nized in Gideon, which are truly fundamental to
American justice. Then there are rights which are
the product of the unrestrained determination by
a majority of the present Supreme Court as to
what is best, such as the rights recognized in Mi-
randa.
If the prospective-only rights must be deemed
fundamental because they are of constitutional
dimension and made applicable to the States
through an invocation of the Due Process clause,
then the fully retrospective rights must be deemed
"very fundamental." But, as has been remarked
in a different context, "There is a certain inele-
gance in speaking of rights 'very basic to a free
society' or in indulging in what appears to be al-
most a comparison of superlatives." 118 It is surely
true that "to label a right 'basic to a free society'
is to say as much as can be said."119
The Supreme Court, in Linkletter and its prog-
eny, has always denied that it has embarked upon
the categorization of rights as fundamental and
more fundamental by claiming the power to deny
some constitutional rights retrospective effect.
But nowhere more than in the prospective-only
decisions does there appear a dear indication that
this is precisely what the Court is doing. Consider,
for instance, the majority opinion in Stovall, which
16 Mishkin, supra note 113, at 62-63.
11 Although the Supreme Court affirmed a death
sentence in Stovall, a change in New York law operated
to vacate it. Certainly many prisoners now under death
sentences would be benefitted by retroactive applica-
tions of Wade and Miranda.
ns Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment, in




denied retroactive application to the right of
counsel at line-up, which right had been recog-
nized in Wade. A defendant's right to due process
under the fourteenth amendment is violated by a
denial of that right to counsel at a line-up, but if
that violation occurred before the date of the
Wade decision, he is not automatically entitled to
relief12 But if he can show a violation of due
process not by pointing to his admitted right to
counsel under the fourteenth amendment but
rather by showing that "the totality of circum-
stances" amounted to such a violation, he can win
relief."' It thus appears that the Court has recog-
nized not only that there are fundamental rights
and more fundamental rights, but also that there
is due process and "very due process."
On the other hand, perhaps the prospective-
only decisions have driven the Court to adopt the
position that a right need not be deemed funda-
mental in order to be raised to the level of a con-
stitutional right under the Due Process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In Desist v. United
States"' Justice Stewart, while denying retroactive
effect to Katz v. United States,"7 seemed to acknowl-
edge as much. He said that this refusal to make
Katz retroactive did not deny anyone a fundamen-
tal constitutional right. Rather, he stated, the
Court was simply declining to extend a "court-
made exclusionary rule" which has "no bearing
on guilt" or on "the fairness of trial." 1 4 Court
made or not, the Katz rule was said to be con-
stitutionally compelled and was recognized by
Stewart's own decision in Desist to be binding
upon the States through the Due Process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.11 Yet to justify
non-retroactivity it was held not to involve "a
fundamental constitutional right." At least at
this point, if not much earlier, Palko v. Connect-
icut"2 must be read as Justice Cardozo's demand
that his name be withdrawn as a would-be sup-
porter of what the Court has done in Linkletter
and the cases which have followed.
Precedents Not Involving Overrulings
of Judicial Decisions
To support the application of the prospective-
only technique to the area of constitutional crimi-
121388 U.S. at 299-302.
12388 U.S. at 302.
394 U.S. 244 (1969).
- 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 394 U.S. 244, n.24 (1969).
125 394 U.S. 244, (1969).
-6 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
nal procedure, the Linkletter majority also relied
upon a few cases which did not involve prospec-
tive-only treatment by a court of one of its own
new decisions. In Gelpcke v. City of DubuqueY the
issue dividing the Court was whether the United
States Supreme Court could give such treatment
to a new Iowa decision. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Company1 " dealt with whether a federal district
court in a diversity case was bound by a relevant
state decision handed down after the filing of the
federal action. Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sun-
burst Oil and Refining Co."9 decided that the Fed-
eral Constitution did not prohibit state courts
from using the prospective-only technique.
Whether or not a decision declaring a federal
statute unconstitutional was to be given retroac-
tive effect was an issue not reached in Chicot
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank'1"
because the doctrine of res judicata was held to
bar the plaintiff in any case. Because these de-
cisions did not involve prospective-only overrul-
ings by courts of their own prior decisions, they
had even less force as precedent for Linkletter than
had the ones previously discussed. The majority's
primary reason for citing them seemed to be that
they were decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. Decisions from that Court touching upon
the prospective-only technique were few. If it was
fair to suggest that the Supreme Court was familiar
with the technique, it was less than candid to pre-
tend that these decisions had any force as prec-
edent for what was being done in Linkletter.
The remaining authority cited in the majority
opinion treated the issue of whether the prospec-
tive only technique, if employed, must be limited
to instances where there had been a final decision
or whether the Court could apply it also to deny
the effect of the decision on cases pending at the
time the new decision came down. It is to this dis-
cussion that attention is now turned.
Limitations Upon The Prospective-Only
Technique
Having rejected the counsel of dissenters Black
and Douglas, 1 ' and having determined that the
Supreme Court could and would decide which
newly recognized constitutional safeguards in the
criminal process were to be denied retroactive ap-
68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863).
215 U.S. 349 (1910).
"'287 U.S. 358 (1932).
130 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
111381 U.S. 618, 640-53.
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plication, the majority went on to inquire whether
there existed any theoretical limitations upon the
exercise of this power. The majority decided that
while they could deny retroactive effect to con-
stitutional decisions when a judgment had become
final before the date of the new constitutional
decision and now was being collaterally attacked,
nevertheless "(u)nder our cases it appears ... that
a chiange in law will be given effect while a case is on
direct review." 1 This dictum, when spoken, was
extremely significant. The Court had already
given the benefit of Mapp to parties who had been
convicted through the use of unconstitutionally
seized evidence in cases which had been tried be-
fore the date of the Mapp decision but which were
still on direct review after that date. 3 The Court
had done this without any reference to the pro-
spective-only possibility. Now the Court stated
that prior precedent forbade any other disposition
and that this precedent dictated that the prospec-
tive-only technique be used only in cases where
final convictions had been obtained prior to the
date of the new decision.
That a majority of the Supreme Court believed
that the power was so limited was demonstrated
by its conduct subsequent to Griffin v. California."'
Although the retroactivity issue was apparent
from the outset, the Court applied Griffin to cases
on direct review and considered only whether final
decisions should be upset by virtue of the Griffin
decision. The precise sequence was this: Griffin
was argued March 9, 1965 and Linkletter was ar-
gued two days later. The Griffin decision was an-
nounced April 28, 1965. On May 17, 1965 the
Court vacated a decision on direct review on the
strength of Griffin. I ' On May 24, 1965 it ordered
the parties to a habeas corpus case to brief the
issue of whether Griffin should be available to those
attacking final judgments.'86 On December 13,
1965, the Court again gave the benefit of Griffin to
a petitioner on direct review in O'Connor v. Ohio,"7
even though Linkletter had been decided the pre-
vious June. Finally, in early 1966, the Shot opinion
was announced. It cited O'Connor and stated,
12 381 U.S. at 627 (emphasis supplied).
"'See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963);
Stoner v. California, 376 483 (1964). That Linkletter
was applicable on direct review was also the basic as-
sumption of the discussion in Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963).
1"4380 U.S. 609 (1965).
"I Howell v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 275 (1965).
135 Tehan v. Shott, 381 U.S. 923 (1965).
1- 382 U.S. 286 (1965).
"Nor is there any question as to the applicability
of the Griffin rule as to cases still pending on direct
review at the time it was announced." 138
If the assumption articulated in Sholt was true,"19
namely that the prosecutor probably commented
upon the defendant's failure to take the stand in
every jury trial where a defendant did not testify
in the six states which had not prohibited such
comment prior to Griffin, this mean that the Court
did not feel free to deny the benefit of Griffin to
cases on direct review despite the fact that every
single case in these six states on direct appeal from
a jury trial in which the defendant had not taken
the stand was infected with reversible error unless
the comment could be deemed "harmless beyond
all reasonable doubt." 0 The Supreme Court thus
took the "final decision" limitation very seriously.
The proposition that "under our cases" the
prospective-only technique was limited to instances
where final judgments had been rendered was
incredible. It was an exception which, if adhered
to, practically swallowed the rule. It contradicted
the very cases relied upon to demonstrate that
prospective-only overruling was a familiar tech-
nique accompanying the judicial abrogation of
old common-law rules.
This exception permitted the use of the tech-
nique only in such areas where other doctrines,
such as res judicata,'14 did not prevent an attack
upon a final judgment-that is, chiefly in criminal
post-conviction proceedings of one sort or another.
But the latter area was precisely where the Su-
preme Court prior to Linkletter had never author-
ized the technique's use.
The basis of this "limitation" was that a review-
ing court must "dispose of (the) case according to
the law as it exists at the time of final judgment,
and not as it existed at the time of the appeal." 4
When this proposition is applied to include case
law which has changed in the same jurisdiction in
which the appeal is brought, it makes impossible
the most familiar type of prospective-only over-
ruling. Once sovereign tort immunity is abolished,
this "limiting" principle would dictate that all
cases which reach finality subsequent to the over-
ruling decision must follow the new rule of no im-
'2 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 409 n.3 (1966).
139 382 U.S. at 418.
"' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
ILI See text accompanying note 130, supra.
' Comment, supra note 5, at 912, citing Montague




munity, even though the tort occurred prior to
the overruling decision. All talk of the need to pro-
tect vested rights (with respect to failure to insure)
and all discussion of justifiable reliance would be
silenced by a limitation which dictates that all
matters must be decided according to the law
which prevails at the time that the judgment be-
comes final.
To support this curious limitation, the Court
erroneously relied upon cases which did not involve
a court's confrontation of one of its own overruling
decisions in deciding a case which arose prior to
the overruling decision.' 4 Rather the "precedents"
turned upon the duty of a federal court to recog-
nize intervening changes brought about by the
signing of a treaty, the amending of a statute, or
the overruling of a state precedent by a state court.
United States v. Schooner Peggy'4 held that a
treaty which intervened while a prize case was on
direct review required that the prize award be va-
cated, especially since the treaty specifically called
for the return of property not "definitively con-
demned" as of the effective date of the treaty. A
second decision held that a stockholder's suit to
enjoin certain payments by a corporation was
rendered moot by the repeal, pendente lite, of the
statute which had required the payments.'45 A
third decision held that a statute passed after the
filing of a suit and interpreted to remove the avail-
ability of the remedy prayed for required that the
suit be dismissed. 46 Another case applied a sta-
tutory change which altered the rights of various
parties in a bankruptcy proceeding to a case pend-
ing at the time of the amendment.'l Finally, a
fifth case held that a federal court reviewing a
decision in a federal diversity case could not ig-
nore relevant state decisions announced prior to
the completion of federal review.' 0
The extent of a federal court's duty to follow the
law created by recent state decisions, new treaties,
or new statutes is irrelevant to the issue of whether
a court may afford its own decisions prospective-
only treatment. The use of these cases to suggest
143 By "arose" it is meant that the transaction oc-
curred prior to the date of the new decision, whether or
not the action was filed before that date.
144 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 102 (1801).
145 Dinsmore v. Southern Express Company and
Georgia Railroad Commission, 183 U.S. 115 (1901).
146 Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224
U.S. 290 (1912).
147 Carpenter v. Wabash Railway Co., 309 U.S. 23(1940).
"s Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S.
538 (1941).
that there is a significant limitation upon a court's
power to make new law for the future only marked
the higbpoint of the misuse of precedent in the
Linkletter opinion 4 This theoretical limitation
imposed by "our cases" passed out of existence in
Johnson v. New Jersey"' without a word of burial
for the precedents which had been invoked to sup-
port the proposition that "under our cases it
appears ... that a change in law will be given ef-
fect while it is on direct review." Later Mr. justice
Stewart, ignoring the lengthy discussion of these
precedents as well as the adherence to this limita-
tion after Griffin would say that the Court in Link-
letter imposed no such limitation upon the pro-
spective-only technique but merely recognized that
it had already given the benefit of Mapp to cer-
tain litigants on direct review before Linkletter
reached the court."' But the discussion of those
precedents remain in the Linkletter opinion and
now serves the limited purpose of reminding the
reader of the sort of materials out of which that
majority opinion was carved.2
FACTORS roR DETEPauNiNG WHEN TO INVOKE
ThE PRosPEcTIvE-ONLY DocmnE
Having claimed a general power to refuse the
retroactive application of decisions recognizing
new constitutional guarantees for citizens con-
fronted by the criminal process, and having limited
'19 If the prospective-only technique is adopted for
use in constitutional criminal procedure, we may wish
to limit its use to cases where a final judgment has been
rendered. But that would depend upon a policy choice
and not upon any theoretical limitations.
150 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
"' Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 252 n.20
(1969).
102 For those interested in history, the mistaken use of
precedent may be traced. It began with an error in the
analysis of the student Comment, supra note 5, at 912-
14, was repeated in the respondent's concession "that
the (Peggy) case stands for the proposition for which it
contends, i.e., that a change in the law will be given ef-
fect while a case is on direct review, but cannot neces-
sarily be invoked on collateral attack." 381 U.S. 618,
623 n.8. From there the error was but a short step from
incorporation into the Linkletter opinion.
The Yale commentator and the respondent should
have noted the irrelevancy of The Peggy to the pro-
spective-only overruling issue. The commentator saw
the distinctive feature but thought that the Court in
Vandenbark had considered the distinction irrelevant.
What the commentator missed was that Vandenbark
had a distinguishing feature of its own: the duty of afederal court to follow a state decision. Hence the
Peggy and Vandenbark were similar in so far as they re-
flected a duty to respect some outside authority and
were both distinguishable from the case where a court




this power to cases where judgments have become
final, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether
it should exercise the power in Linkletter's habeas
corpus proceeding, where it was claimed that his
conviction should be vacated because of a Mapp
violation. The majority enunciated some reason-
able and useful criteria to guide that determination.
Earnest judicial consideration of three factors
would yield the answer to whether a particular
constitutional decision should be accorded prospec-
tive-only treatment, assuming that the Supreme
Court can and should make such a determination.
Purpose-Reliability
The first criterion was whether the purpose of
the new safeguard was to enhance the reliability
of the determination that the defendant had en-
gaged in the alleged criminal conduct. The Court
emphasized that the exclusionary rule of Mapp
has "no bearing on guilt." It stated that there was
"no likelihood of unreliability" in a search and
seizure case. The right under Mapp was to be dis-
tinguished from rights which were intended to up-
grade "the fairness of the trial-the very integrity
of the fact-finding process." 53 The opinion did not
suggest, as one commentator has speculated, 15
that if the new right bore any real relationship to
the reliability of the conviction, the right would be
applied retrospectively. It drew a distinction be-
tween those rights which go to the very integrity
of the fact-finding process and those which have
nothing to do with the reliability of the adjudica-
tion of guilt, but it did not pause to consider rights
whose purpose fell somewhere in between.' 5
Some learned men have argued that a safeguard
is an absolute right once it is raised to the level of
a constitutional requirement, and that, thereafter,
its purpose becomes irrelevant. They contend that
it is improper to give more favorable treatment
to one right than to another because of differences
in purpose.5 But once it has been decided that
1'381 U.S. at 638-39.
114 Mishkin, supra note 113, at 98.
1 There was a side dispute between the majority
and the dissenters over whether it was fair to char-
acterize the purpose of Mapp as solely the deterrence of
unlawful police conduct or whether it also included
reparation for a particular violation of the victim's
constitutional rights. But when the "purpose" of a
decision is defined to mean whether the decision's
rationale is designed to improve the reliability of the
fact-finding process, this whole dispute becomes ir-
relevant. judged by this definition Mapp's purpose
clearly was not to improve reliability.
'"We argee that the underlying policy objective of
the doctrine of exclusion is to deter. The doctrine of
some constitutional rights will be treated differ-
ently from others in that only some will receive
retrospective application, no better distinction
exists than one based upon the reliability function
of the various constitutional safeguards. As the
amicus in Linkletter suggested, 157 if the adminis-
tration of criminal justice can afford only a cer-
tain amount of retroactivity for new decisions, it
is best to give the benefit to persons who may have
lost a chance to establish their innocence by virtue
of a denial of a right which is related to the re-
liability of their conviction-for instance those
convicted felons who were denied trial counsel
before the Gideon decision. Recall also that both
Justice Black and Chief Justice Traynor have
suggested that the absence of a reliability-related
violation might always justify denial of relief from
a final conviction."s
Another objection made against the purpose-
reliability test is that the difficulty of applying
this standard makes it impossible to predict
whether any particular newly announced right will
be given prospective-only treatment. It is said
that even an expert might have guessed incor-
rectly what answer would have been yielded by a
Supreme Court application of the purpose-relia-
bility test to determine, for instance, whether
Griffin v. California would be applied retroactively.
The simple answer is that predictability is not a
crucial factor when the Supreme Court quickly
announces whether an important newly announced
right shall operate retrospectively. The decision on
Miranda's retroactivity was made later in the
same month in which Miranda had been decided.
The non-retroactivity of Wade and Gilbert and the
retroactivity of Witherspoon were determined
on the same day that those decisions were an-
nounced. The Supreme Court did not delay long
in resolving the retroactivity issue in connection
with Katz, Duncan v. Louisiana, Bloom v. Illinois,
Bruton v. United States, Lee v. Florida; Barber v.
Page, or Mempa v. Rhay, but rather decided the
issue within a year of each decision, and often
exclusion is nevertheless a Constitutional privilege of
the victim and its status as such as not altered by
identification of its purpose." California v. Hurst, 325
F.2d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1963), reV'd, 381 U.S. 760
(1965). For more of this "a right-is-a-right" approach,
see Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963);
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 747-48.
"7Brief for National District Attorneys' Association
as Amicus Curiae at 20, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965).
11 See note 3, supra.
JAMES B. HADDAD
within a much shorter period.'59 The Supreme
Court, if it has not already done so, could adopt a
policy of always deciding the more critical retro-
activity issues as soon as they arise, allowing time
only for briefs and argument. 60
Further, as more cases in the area are decided,
certain patterns should emerge making predictions
of Supreme Court action more reliable. For in-
stance, by now it is dear that any decision related
to the right to counsel in various phases of judicial
proceedings will be given retroactive application.'6
It is also contended that the purpose-reliability
test is too complex to be useful. How, for instance,
can the Court say that Miranda or Grifin v. Cali-
fornia have nothing to do with reliability, even
though the main value they seek to protect has
little to do with the reliability of the determination
of guilt? This problem is illusory once it is decided
that the new right can be accorded prospective-
only treatment even though its purpose is not
totally unrelated to the reliability factor. Although
the number of unreliable confessions might dimin-
ish slightly because of Miranda, the warnings
creating a slightly less coercive atmosphere, the
Supreme Court can quite properly conclude, as it
did in Johnson v. New Jersey, that this part of the
purpose of Miranda was not significant enough to
justify retroactive application under the purpose-
reliability test.
The real objection to the purpose-reliability
test is that the Supreme Court has disregarded it
where a majority of the Court dislikes the result
which its application would yield. In at least three
instances the Court has simply chosen to ignore
129 See notes 18-20 and the accompanying text,
supra.
160 The Court has been criticized for its wait-and-see
policy following Mapp and Escobedo. See, e.g., Nothrop,
supra note 77, at 8, 12; Schaefer, supra note 105, at
645. But cf. Comment, supra note 5, at 935. The Yale
commentator in urging that lower courts be allowed to
grapple with retroactivity issues first was writing in
1962, whereas Justice Schaefer and Judge Nothrop had
the benefit of witnessing the division of the federal cir-
cuit courts over retroactivity issues and the refusal of
state courts to follow federal circuit decisions in favor
of retroactivity, creating great uncertainty and confu-
sion. On the other hand, the deciding of critical issues of
retroactivity, such as the retroactivity of Bruton v.
United States, without the benefit of briefs or argu-
ment, as occurred in Roberts v. Russell, is absolutely
intolerable to would-be litigants. In Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S-_, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969), Cali-
fornia, joined by more than twenty states as amici,
made the modest request that the court listen to argu-
ments and re-consider the retroactivity question as to
Bruton. No acknowledgment of this plea is reflected in
the Harrington opinions.
' See McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
its own articulated rationale for a particular de-
cision when it has been faced with the problem of
determining whether that decision should be ap-
plied retroactively 6 2
In Griffin v. California the Court stated that a
significant purpose of the no-comment rule was to
prevent a jury from erroneously convicting an in-
nocent man who chooses not to testify.'" In de-
ciding whether that decision should be applied
retrospectively, the Court in Tehan v. United
States ex rel. Sholt, however, totally ignored that
purpose which had been articulated as a basis for
Grifin 6U Then, in an opinion announced after the
Shott decision, the Court went back to recognizing
that the purpose of Griffin was to increase the re-
liability of the guilt-determining process.1 65
In the case of Wade and Gilbert, the purpose-
reliability function was one-hundred per cent-that
is to say, the right to counsel at line-ups was de-
signed to improve the reliability of the fact-finding
process and was granted for no other reason.66
Yet in Stovall the Court seemed to reason that since
Wade and Gilbert would not increase reliability
by a very great margin, retrospective application
should be denied. In this bit of judicial sleight
of hand, the Supreme Court ignored the degree to
which the purpose of a new decision was the im-
provement of reliability and substituted the degree
to which reliability would be improved by the new
decision--something which the Court could just
as well have done with Bruton, for instance, but
did not.
Finally, the requirement of a jury trial in a
1
2'It is of course the Supreme Court's expressed
rationale for a decision which should be determinative
of whether the purpose of a particular decision is re-
lated to the reliability of the fact-finding process. In
Bruton, for instance, the Court clearly indicated that it
was seeking to prevent juries from considering un-
reliable evidence (the out-of-court accusations of a co-
defendant). Thus it made no difference that Learned
Hand in criticizing the practice condemned in Bruton
noted that it was a practice which "probably furthers
rather than impedes, the search for truth. .. " Nash v.
United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007, (2d Cir. 1932), or
that the California Supreme Court, which reached the
Bruton result before the United States Supreme Court
did, has stated: "Our ruling, however, did not stem from
a belief that the former procedure created a grave risk
of convicting innocent defendants..." People v.
Charles, 66 Cal. 2d 330, 333, 425 P.2d 545, 547, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 745, 747 (1967).
16 380 U.S. at 613.
164 Even those critical of the Griffin decision have
criticized the Court for ignoring in Shott the rationale
expressed in Griffith. See W. SCHAEFER, THE Susprcr
Am SocrETY 66 (1967).
16-5 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
161 "Although the Court in Wade and Gilbert might
have stressed the indignities of a lineup which the pres-
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serious criminal contempt proceeding was predi-
cated in part upon the assumption that there may
be some doubt about a trial judge's ability to ren-
der a fair and impartial decision which is not
present in the ordinary criminal case. This factor
was recognized in both Bloom'7 and DeStefano.1 s
Yet the Court in DeStanfano merely paid lip serv-




A second factor suggested by the Linkletter ma-
jority for determining which decisions should be
denied retroactive effect was past "reliance" by
the States upon a Supreme Court decision which
had just been overruled. Such reliance upon a
court's decision was, for the most part, a pre-
requisite for the invocation of the prospective-only
technique in areas where it had been used prior to
Linkletter. Even today a civil litigant who argues
that a new decision should be denied retroactive
effect must be prepared to point to a specific de-
cision which had held contrary to the new deci-
sion 17
On the other hand, Linkletter implicitly indicated
that such reliance upon a particular decision
would be considered justified even though the old
rule was under attack for a period of years. Wolf
was criticized from the day it was decided, and
about half of the States had adopted exlusionary
rules. A few states had adopted such rules after
Wolf was decided. Yet those states which did not
were still permitted to raise the claim of their
reliance upon Wolf. This was consonant with the
operation of the prospective-only technique in
ence of counsel would serve to avoid, the Court seems
to have been interested only in the accuracy of the
guilt-determining process." Comment, The Suprene
Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAzv. L. REv. 110, 178. (1967).
Mr. Justice Harlan recently noted that Stovall was, in
fact, a case of denying retroactivity to a decision whose
purpose was to improve the reliability of the fact-finding
process. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 257
(1969) (dissenting opinion).
167 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
' DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
1 Because of this factor there was a basis for apply-
ing Bloom retroactively while denying retroactivity to
Duncan v. Louisiana, as the Court in DeStefano im-
plicitly recognized by treating the issues separately.
By any standards, the denial of retroactivity for the
Bloom decision was the most unnecessary invocation of
the prospective-only technique. The number of cases
affected would have been a tiny fraction of the number
which have been affected by the retroactive applica-
tion of Bruton v. United States.
170 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968).
other areas of the law. The doctrine of sovereign
tort immunity was under attack for many years,
but that did not prevent courts which abolished
the doctrine from using the prospective-only
techniquePm
The criticism is misplaced which maintains that
Linkletter was a bad case in which to speak of re-
liance since Wolf had held that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbade state officials from engaging
in searches and seizures which, if performed by
federal authorities, 'would violate the Fourth
Amendment. 1 2 It ignores the fact that the rule of
Mapp is not violated until trial and that it is at
this point that reliance by state prosecutors and
judges -becomes important 7 State prosecutors
did not have to make a record demonstrating the
legality of the seizure of the evidence they offered
if their state did not employ an exlusionary rule.
In these states no hearings were held at the time
when the defendant's claim of an unlawful search
could best be met, for the Supreme Court in Wolf
had said no such hearings were necessary. Not
subject to federal review, states which had ex-
clusionary rules were free to admit evidence so
long as it conformed to state courts' determinations
171 See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
District No. 302, 18 ll.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, cert.
denkd, 362 U.S. 968 (1959). Of course we could adopt a
higher standard of justifiable reliance so as to reward
those states which anticipate changes in the law rather
than those which move only under Supreme Court
compulsion, as Justice Fortas suggested in arguing for
the retroactivity of Katz. Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 276-77 (1969) (dissenting opinion). The rea-
soning of Fortas could just have well been applied in
Linkletter since the States which did not anticipate the
overthrow of Wolf were the main beneficiaries of
Linkletter.
In connection with the position taken by Fortas in
Desist, consider Cardozo's statement that the tech-
nique of prospective-only overruling should not be
extended for the benefit of those who relied upon the
old rule as a weapon of deceit or malice and his obser-
vation that the instances of honest reliance and gen-
uine disappointment are rarer than they are supposed
to be by those who exalt the virtues of stability and
certainty. Cardozo, supra note 104, reprinted in M. L,
HAIL, supra note 104, at 34-35.
in2 Mishkin, supra note 113, at 73, has expressed such
criticism.
in The National District Attorneys' Association it-
self misstated the reliance issue: "In the instant case,
for instance, a warrant to search the premises easily
could have been obtained." Brief for National District
Attorneys' Association as Amicus Curiae at 18. Wolf
hardly said state officials could engage in warrantless
searches of homes and offices in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Where the search was, in fact, illegal, the
plea for non-retroactivity was simply a request that the
States be permitted to keep the fruits of the conduct
which was unlawful even by the standards prevailing
when it occurred.
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of what constituted a legal search. They did not
have to worry about preserving a record by not
offering evidence which might later, under a federal
standard, be deemed the product of an unlawful
search, for there was no federal requirement that
such evidence not be introduced in a state trial
even if the search was unlawful.
Griffin v. California provides another example of
justified reliance. Since prior to 1964 the prevailing
decisions of the Supreme Court indicated that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was not binding upon the States, in those
states where no state rule prohibited comment
upon a defendant's failure to testify, prosecutors
undoubtedly did comment frequently." 4 A retro-
active application of Griffin would mean that in
many cases the prosecution would be worse off
than if the Supreme Court had forbidden such
comment in state courts long ago--for now it had
to demonstrate that the comment was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt,u15 in other words, that
it could not have affected the verdict. Presumably
many or most of the convictions could have been
obtained without the comment, but now the state
would have to prove this in each individual case."6
Duncan v. Louisiana" is another case in point.
There is nothing to indicate that those few juris-
dictions which denied the right of jury trials in
certain cases where the possible punishment ex-
ceeded six months in jail were able to secure a
higher conviction rate because of that denial. Yet
a retroactive application of Duncan would provide
many thousands of defendants with a full-proof
claim that their convictions must be vacated be-
cause they were denied the right to trial by
jury.,
14 Justice Harlan has noted that state prosecutors
who commented upon a defendant's failure to testify
after Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), could not
claim justifiable reliance since Griffin was inevitable
once the self-incrimination clause was applied to the
States. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 266-67
(1969).
175 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
276 Justice Stewart noted that a jury may draw an
inference of guilt from the defendant's silence even if no
comment is made. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
621 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
"'391 U.S. 145 (1968).
1 If Duncan were retroactive, it would hardly be
fair to limit its application to cases where a request for
a jury trial had been made-since state law did not
permit jury trials in these sorts of cases. Almost no one
has suggested that the effect of retroactive decisions
should be limited by applying a waiver doctrine which
would reward only those who anticipated a new de-
cision and asked for something to which under prevail-
ing law they were not entitled. For a good discussion on
this point, see Torcia & King, supra note 3, at 286.
The primary objection to the reliance test out-
lined in Linkletter is that the Court has abandoned
it wherever its application would yield an "un-
desirable" result, just as it has abandoned the
purpose-reliability test in certain instances. De-
siring to apply Bruton retroactively, the Court in
Roberts v. Russell said that prosecutors could not
properly point to reliance upon its 1957 Deli
-Paoli v. United States"9 decision since that decision
had been greatly criticized and since some state
and federal jurisdictions no longer permitted the
practice which Delli Paoli had sanctioned but which
Bruton now condemned18 Linkletter had made it
clear that such attacks and such voluntary aban-
donments of an old practice by some did not
prevent a claim of reliance by others from being en-
tertained any more than had attacks upon old com-
mon-law rules. Again after Brutton was held retro-
active, the Court itself once more recognized that
attacks upon the old decisions-and even erosion of
those decisions in subsequent Supreme Court cases
-have no relevance to the reliance standard
announced in Linkletter. Even though Schwartz v.
Texas"' was severely criticized and even though
Olmstead v. United States'5 ' was both attacked and
eroded long before the 1967 Term, reliance upon
those old cases was held to justify the denial of full
retroactive effect for Fuller v. Alaska and Katz v.
United States."'
On the other hand, Wade and Gilbert were ques-
tions of first impression. Prosecutors could point
to no Supreme Court decision which was overruled
by those decisions. There was no decision analogous
to Wolf or Delli Paoli in the line-up area. Hence
the talk in Stovall about reliance was misplaced.
The Wade and Gilbert decisions were merely new
and unexpected, but this had not been the test
articulated in Linkletter nor in the cases upon which
Linkletter had relied as authority. Mere newness is
not a standard which can separate those rights
which should be applied retroactively from those
which should not. In every case where such a de-
cision must be made, we will be dealing with a
newly announced rule and trying to decide whether
it should be applied retrospectively. If in some of
these cases we choose to deny retroactive applica-
tion even though there was no prior decision upon
which reliance had been placed, we should honestly
17 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
M Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 295 (1968).
m 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
- 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
' See notes 21-24 and accompanying text, supra.
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admit that we are abandoning the "reliance" con-
cept as it was expressed in Linkletter.
The Orderly Adminstration of Criminal Justice
Finally, the Linkletter court noted that there are
"interests in the administration of justice and the
integrity of judicial administration to consider." 114
The Court was careful to indicate that this third
criterion for determining which decisions should be
denied retroactive application was more sophis-
ticated than the simple notion that retroactivity
must be avoided in cases where such an application
of a new decision would free prisoners in large
numbers. The majority phrased the problem this
way: "Hearings would have to be held on the ex-
cludability of evidence long since destroyed, mis-
placed or deteriorated. If it is excluded, the wit-
nessses available at the time of the original trial
will not be available or if located their memory will
be dim." "I
Whether witnesses will be available on re-trial is
not a helpful standard in determining which new
decisions should be applied retroactively since the
problem of missing witnesses will always be present
when a new trial is ordered and will not vary ac-
cording to the nature of the violation which was the
basis for the order requiring a new trial. The only
way to ease the problem of missing witnesses upon
re-trial is to set a statute of limitations after which
claims about error at the first trial will no longer
be entertained. The Supreme Court had already
refused to do this in Fay v. Noi.' 9. 9 The passage of
time and anticipated problems upon re-trial pro-
vide no basis for denying relief from the violation
of a constitutional right under prevailing federal
law.
Hence in Stovall the Court clarified the short-
hand language it had employed in Linkletter: if an
evidentiary hearing, with the attendant problems
of dull memories and missing witnesses, would be
necessary to determine if a constitutional right was
violated, that fact militates against a retroactive
application of a new decision. The Court in Stovall
said: "Doubtless, too, inquiry (at a hearing) would
be handicapped by the unavailability of witnesses
and dim memories." 17
This is a rational standard which could be the
basis of separating one decision from another for
the purpose of determining which should be given
14381 U.S. at 637.
185 Id.
18 372 U.S. 391 (1963).18 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967).
prospective-only application. For instance, if no
motion to suppress was made at a state trial before
Mapp because the state had no exclusionary rule,
an evidentiary hearing would be required if Mapp
were given retroactive application, at least in those
cases where the trial record does not reveal the full
circumstances of the arrest or search. Similarly, a
retroactive application of Wade would require
"taint" hearings to determine if the in-court identi-
fication of the defendant by an eye-witness was the
product of an unlawful line-up or whether it had
independent origins.m On the other hand, to deter-
mine whether Duncan v. Louisiana had been vi-
olated, no evidentiary hearing would be needed.
One would merely consult state law to determine
if a jury trial, as required by Duncan, had been
guaranteed by the state at the time of the de-
fendant's trial.P Where a state concedes that it
has not anticipated Miranda (almost every case)
or where the per se error condemned in Gilbert v.
California (the introduction of evidence of an out-
of-court identification where the defendant had not
been afforded his right to counsel) had occurred,
no hearing would be required. The only inquiry
would be whether, from the face of the record, the
error could be deemed harmless.
There are two problems with this criterion, how-
ever. In the first place, the Supreme Court has
elsewhere indicated that it is unsympathetic to the
administrative difficulties of holding evidentiary
hearings in collateral proceedings to determine
whether constitutional error was committed at
trial 0
Secondly, the preceding discussion of Duncan,
Miranda, and Gilbert indicates that the Supreme
Court has abandoned the "hearing-memory"
criterion except in name only. As indicated before,
by that standard Miranda and Duncan should
have been applied retroactively since no eviden-
tiary hearings would have been necessary to dis-
cover whether error had occurred. As also indi-
cated, if Gilbert had been applied retroactively, no
hearings would have been necessary. 9 The Court's
assertion that Gilbert should not be applied retro-
actively because of the "unavailability of witnesses
and dim memories" 192 at the evidentiary hearing
183 Presumably law enforcement officers will rarely
advance the remarkable claim that they gave the re-
quired warnings concerning counsel at a line-up prior
to the date of Wade and Gilbert.
189 See note 179 and accompanying text, supra.
"'0 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
1 See text following note 189, supra.
19 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967).
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to determine if Gilbert had been violated marks the
summit of the Court's arbitrary invocation of the
Linkleter criteria to reach a desired result.
THE FELT NEED FOR PROSPECTIVE-
ONLY OVE-ULINGS
What has been seen to this point indicates that
the Supreme Court has paid a high price for the
right to deny retroactive application to certain new
decisions. The prospective-only doctrine was born
amidst a misuse of precedent and has been nour-
ished with a disregard for the very standards which
the Court suggested should guide its use. It has
survived the unfounded "direct review" limitation
announced in Linkletter through the Court's use
bf the'unadmirable pretense that no such limita-
tion was ever announced. Use of the prospective-
only technique has rewarded jurisdictions which
have declined to upgrade standards of criminal
procedure without Supreme Court compulsion and,
to use the words of former Justice Fortas, it has
placed "dunce caps" upon those jurisdictions which
have acted without any such compulsion. 93
Finally the invocation of the prospective-only
technique has been characterized by an: arbitrari-
ness toward individual litigants unwort of the
nation's highest court. There is something offen-
sive about the notion that the Supreme Court of
the United States, like the sometimes-just, some-
times-generous vineyard owner,19' can bestow its
favors upon whomever it pleases. In calling for a
reconsideration of the prospective-only technique
recently, Mr. Justice Harlan spoke of the "truism
that it is the task of this Court, like that of any
other, to do justice to each litigant on the merits
of his own case." He further stated that it is only
"if each of our decisions can be justified in terms
of this fundamental premise that they may prol5erly
be considered the legitimate products of a court of
law..." 19.
I so speaking, he renewed a thesis which Justice
Douglas and Justice Black have advanced con-
sistently beginning with their Linkletter dissent.
It is arbitrary to give the benefit of a new rule to
one petitioner and not to another simply because
one case is needed as a vehicle for announcing a
new decision, and one is needed as a vehicle for
announcing that that first decision will not be
193 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 277 (1969)
(dissenting opinion).114 MATTIMw ch.20, vv. 1-16.
I'5 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259 (dis-
senting opinion).
applied retroactively. Mr. Justice Douglas
pointed out that the rules announced in Miranda
and its three companion cases could have been
announced in any one of a hundred cases in the
1965 Term, but instead certiorari was denied to all
but the four, the rest forever being denied relief.1 91
In Stovall, even though the Court specifically de-
clared that finality was an irrelevant factor in de-
termining who was to get the benefit of Wade and
Gilbert,117 Stovall, under a sentence of death, was
denied relief, unlike Wade and Gilbert, because the
Court needed a case in which to declare the counsel-
at-line-up requirement non-retroactive 9 Finality
being irrelevant to the issue, there was absolutely
no rational basis for giving relief to Wade and
denying it to Stovall.
The Court has suggested-that someone must be
given the benefit of decisions which create new
rights lest the creativity of counsel be stifled by the
prospect of a prospective-only holding which denies
a client the benefit of a new rule which his attorney
had suggested. 99 In this era it is difficult to take
seriously the suggestion that the creativity of the
criminal bar in its petitions to the Supreme'Court
could ever-be stifled. At any rate, the retroactivity
cases have never followed a rational pattern of re-
warding creativity. Miss Mapp was the beneficiary
of a new rule "even though she did not even urge
that Wof be overruled or focus her attention on the
search issue in her case. 09 As the Supr6me Court it-
self noted, hundreds of requests for reconsideration
of Wolf were turned down before the Mapp de-
decision,201 and these petitioners never did get the
benefit of the Mapp decision because their con-
victions had become final before Mapp was an-
nounced. Shott afforded the Court the opportunity
to bar state prosecutors from commenting on a de-
fendant's silence before Griffin posed the issue.
Certiorari was denied in Shott's caseP2 and he
raised the issue in a collateral attack. He won re-
lief, still before Griffin, at the Circuit Court level.
Then the Supreme Court decided Griffin, granted
certiorari to the state in Shott's case, and reversed
191 In Whisman v. Georgia, 384 U.S. 895 (1966) (dis-
senting opinion) Douglas made his point clear: there is
no reason to discriminate against defendants with cases
which are of about the same "vintage" as Miranda.
" 388 U.S. at 300-01.
'
0 0 See also note 16, supra.
109 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).200 An eleven-line paragraph in an amicus brief sug-
gested the overruling of Wolf. Mapp's brief attacked
the Ohio obscenity statute.201Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
2 Shott v. Ohio, 373 U.S. 240 (1963).
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the order for a new trial for Shott, declaring that
his claim came too late. The Court's method of
rewarding creativity in the Miranda sequence has
already been discussed. 28 Finally, Stovall's counsel
was "rewarded" by seeing his client's show-up
singled out as one of the most egregious types
of unreliable identification procedures which
prompted the need for Wade and Gilbert,204 but his
client's death sentence was affirmed. 2°5
This arbitrariness in affirming and reversing
prompts an inquiry as to why the Court has been
willing to pay such a high price for the use of the
prospective-only technique and whether sound
reasons justify this payment.
Historically, the prospective-only technique has
been used as a means of altering rules of law which-
are badly in need of change, without causing in-
justices by disappointing expectations based upon
the existence of the old rules. Simply stated, the
technique is designed to increase a court's freedom
of action20
Liberal champions of the prospective-only tech-
nique's application to constitutional criminal pro-
cedure, such as former Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan,w have recognized that the tech-
nique permits them to engage in what they sin-
cerely believe is the necessary task of their Court:
the upgrading of the safeguards for citizens con-
fronted by the criminal process, particularly state-
court defendants, in areas where history, they be-
lieve, teaches that lower courts, and particularly
state courts,'simply will not take action.
At the same time, these liberal justices have been
unwilling to ignore the realities of retroactive ap-
plications of wide-sweeping decisions such as
Miranda and Wade. Their backgrounds11 and
their good sense make them unwilling to adopt the
"so be it" attitude of some commentators2 9 The
1 See text accompanying note 196, supra.214 See United States v. Wade; 388 U.S. 218, 229
(1967).205 Stovall's death sentence was vacated by the New
York legislature's partial abolition of the death penalty,
as indicated supra, note 117.211 See generally, Schaefer, supra note 105.
217 Neither Brennan nor Warren has dissented from
any of the Court's prospective-only rulings. Brennan
wrote the majority opinion in Stovall. The Stovallopinion in many respects follows some suggestions
made by Warren in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554,
569 (1967) (dissenting opinion).203 Administrative difficulties at the trial level can
well be appreciated by Brennan, once the chief of a
state trial-court system, and by Warren, who has re-
peatedly expressed concern about the workload of
federal district judges. See, e.g., Warren, Address, 35
F.R.D. 181 (1964).209 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 746.
burden upon state and federal courts, together
with the wholesale release of guilty prisoners, which
would flow from the retroactive application of such
sweeping decisions, however proper those deci-
sions, simply cannot be tolerated.
The alternative to the prospective-only tech-
nique is a more conservative approach to constitu-
tional criminal procedure. Deference to varying
state practices would be required. Detailed federal
standards such as those laid down in Miranda
would no longer be possible. Adoption of safe-
guards, such as the right to counsel at line-ups,
which not a single state anticipated, would also be
impossible. Forliberals the choice is clear.
On the other hand, conservatives and prosecu-
tors who urge the use of the prospective-only tech-
nique as if it were a concession to their interests
surely are not unaware that this technique has in-
cfeased the Supreme Court's freedom to dictate
wide-sweeping and detailed standards made bind-
ing upon: both the federal and state governments
in new decisions of constitutional scope. In ad-
vocating the prospective-only technique in Link-
letter, the National District Attorneys' Association
argued that reform in the area of search and seizure
and reform in criminal procedure in general would
be slowed down unless the technique were
adopted.1 "Some skeptics might have expressed the
belief that the argument was advanced with tongue-
in-cheek by a group unsympathetic to the criminal
law revolution. If this criticism be true, the final
laugh is at the expense of the District Attorneys.
They may, if they wish, boast that their success in
Linkletter played an important part in making,
possible the Miranda and Wade decisions. The dif-
ference between the we-hold-only approach of
Escobedo and the we-dictate-that approach of
Miranda can be traced to the prospective-only tool
made available in the 1965 Linkletter decision. Yet
even today prosecutors, in urging non-retroactive
application' of new decisions, still urge, with in-
creasing insincerity, that the prospective-only
technique is necessary for the future upgrading of
the criminal process.2u
An explanation of this phenomenon is that
prosecutors and the more conservative justices
always have occasion to view the problem in the
context of deciding whether a particular new de-
20 Brief for National District Attorneys' Association.
as Amicus Curiae at p. 27, Iinkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965).
2n Brief for The State of New York as Amicus Curiae
at pp. 22-23, Harrington v. California, 395 U.S__, 89
S. Ct. 1726 (1969).
1969]
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cision should be applied retroactively. They rarely
have occasion to pause to consider the significance
of the general availability of the prospective-only
technique of overruling old law. A prosecutor who
faced the suppression of all confessions in cases
awaiting trial on the date of the Miranda decision
naturally expresses disappointment that the Court
did not make Miranda completely prospective by
making the date of the confession critical rather
than the date of the trial. A district attorney who
stands to lose the judgments he secured in many
and some of his most important and lengthy cases
because of the-retroactive application of Bruton or
Witherspoon complains bitterly about the Supreme
Court's retroactive application of those decisions.21
2
One of the nation's most able prosecutors has re-
marked privately that the Supreme Court could
raise to the level of a constitutional requirement the
duty of the prosectuor to do headstands at trial in
order to secure a conviction as long as this new re-
quirement would be made prospective-only. While
understandable, this attitude hardly promotes the
kind of restraint in constitutional decisions urged
upon the Court by our society's conservatives.
Justices who have opposed the adoption of a new
constitutional rule are generally eager to limit its
impact by denying the new decision retroactive
application. Justice Harlan has specifically ac-
knowledged that this reasoning lay behind his
decision to concur in the prospective-only rulings.na
Until recently, in the major decisions on retroac-
tivity a definite pattern appeared: whenever a
justice had voted against a particular decision, he
always voted for its prospective-only application.
There was but one exception, Justice Black, who
held doctrinal reasons for opposing the denial of
retroactivity which he valued more than the op-
portunity to limit the impact of a particular de-
cision which he disfavored 4
By voting for non-retroactivity, the conserva-
2 Lest it be thought that the author takes lightly
the prosecutors' concerns, it should be noted at this
time that in his former role as an appellate attorney for
a prosecutor's office he was faced with the unpleasant
task of trying to sustain pre-Witherspoon death sen-
tences and pre-Bruton judgments of guilty in cases
where reversals would severely disappoint the com-
munity and, at the very least, would cause the loss of
years of trial time.
2 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969)
(dissenting opinion). See also Harlan's terse com-
ments in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 736
(1966) (concurring opinion); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 303 (1967) (concurring opinion) (1967).
214 Justice Black dissented from the line-up holding
in Wade but then voted to apply it retroactively in
Stovall.
tive justices have merely strengthened the device
which has made it much easier for the Court to
proclaim broad decisions of constitutional dimen-
sion. They have eased the path for frequent Su-
preme Court intrusions into state criminal pro-
cedure. In accepting the "concession" made in
Linkletter to federalism, its advocates have reached
out for a poisonous gift. With their own hand they
have clothed federalism to be, like Creon's daugh-
ter, "a bride amidst the dead." 21
A SUGGESTED END xOR TE PRosPEcTrVE-
ONLY TECNQUE
Linkletter v. Walker was an improperly decided
departure from the Supreme Court's well estab-
lished practice of affording the benefit of new con-
stitutional decisions in the criminal-procedure field
to all litigants possessed of a proper means for
challenging their convictions. Its subsequent his-
tory has not enhanced the stature of the Court.
Nevertheless, unlike the special circumstances test
of Bets v. Brady, the prospective-only technique
should be afforded a "respectful burial." 2 16
The prospective-only overrulings of the past
four years need not be overturned. The principle
of stare decisis could properly be invoked as to
those cases. A simple declaration that the Court
has doubts about Linkletter and will not apply
its principle to any future decisions will suffice.
Such a declaration would be desirable for many
reasons. It would end the misuse of precedent upon
which Linkletter is founded by recognizing the
difference between denying a litigant the benefit
of a newly recognized constitutional right and deny-
ing him the benefit of a new decision not of consti-
tutional dimension. It would end the Court's un-
judicial juggling of the three Linkletter criteria for
deciding which decisions should be denied retro-
active application. It would remove any uncer-
tainty of the lower courts as to whether to apply a
decision retroactively before a Supreme Court
pronouncement on the subject. It would end the
arbitrary treatment toward individuals who all
advance the same claim in the same term of court.
It would compel the Supreme Court to give earnest
consideration to the practices of state courts in de-
ciding whether to render a decision which will have
broad retrospective consequences. At the same
time it would reward those states which have
2
'5 MEDEA 984-85.
218 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963),
(concurring opinion). Emphasis supplied.
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moved in anticipation of the Court's will rather
than under compulsion of a specific decree.
Logically one cannot argue that certain major
decisions were made possible because of the pro-
spective-only tool, and at the same time deny
that the unavailability of the tool would restrict
the Court's freedom to take gigantic new steps in
the criminal procedure field. Yet all must recognize
that today's Court is not so timid as to abandon all
further reform simply because new decisions will
have retroactive impact. Both Gideon and Mapp
were decided in an era before there was any in-
dication that the Supreme Court could limit the
impact of these decisions by invoking the prospec-
tive-only technique. More recently, the retroactive
application of Bruton v. United States in Roberts v.
Russell indicates that where the Court believes
that one of its past decisions has worked to deprive
defendants of rights which are truly fundamental,
the Court will not be deterred from announcing a
new rule by the prospect that large numbers of
convictions will be upset by the retroactive opera-
tion of the new rule.
For those who believe that the need for gigantic
steps such as Miranda has ended, for those who
have argued that the Court should function less
like a legislative body in setting down detailed re-
quirements in sweeping decisions, and for those
who believe that the States should be left, in the
first instance, to devise appropriate safeguards in
their own systems of criminal justice administra-
tion, subject to Supreme Court review rather than
Supreme Court requirements of very particular-
ized specificity, the abolition of] the prospective-
only technique should be welcomed as a blessing.
"Non-retroactivity" should be banished from the











Bloom v. Illinois and
Duncan v. Louisiana
Lee v. Florida
Katz v. United States
Denied to citizens whose con-
victions became final before
June 19, 1961.
Denied to citizens whose con-
victions became final before
April 28, 1965.
Denied to citizens whose trials
began on or before June 22,
1964.
Denied to citizens whose
trials began on or before
June 13, 1966.
Denied to citizens who were
deprived of right to counsel
at line-up or show-up held
on or before June 12, 1967.
Denied to citizens who were
deprived of right to jury
trial before May 20, 1968.
Denied to citizens whose
trials began on or before
June 17, 1968 or perhaps to
citizens against whom the
unlawfully intercepted com-
munication was offered into
evidence on or before June
17, 1968.
Denied to citizens who were
the victims of unlawful
wiretapping which occurred
on or before December 18,
1967.
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